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1 Just War or Nothing But War?
Law is a peculiar phenomenon; international law even more so than municipal
systems of jurisprudence. Characterizations of the discipline are myriad, and the
fundamental basis of international law seems to elude definition. From the point
of view of the international lawyer, this can often result in perplexing situations.
When debate takes place within the system of international law—for example, in
an international board of arbitration, in a political organ such as the United Na-
tions or on the pages of legal journals—discussion can go forward and consensus
can be reached even though there seems to be disagreement of the most funda-
mental kind with regard to what the underlying rules of international law are and
to what extent those rules are malleable.
The boundaries of international law, international politics and “the international
system” are indeterminate in character, and it is quite noteworthy indeed that is-
sues on the international arena can be discussed and possibly resolved within such
systems, even in the absence of consensus about their nature—or, as it appears,
even in the absence of awareness about the lack of consensus among different
parties. Evidently, one does not need to consciously subscribe to a particular view,
theory or philosophy of international law to be able to participate in the debate,
as on a practical level, there are numerous facets of the field whose importance
participants in international legal discourse will undoubtedly agree upon, even
though their content may be in dispute.
Notwithstanding the complex and apparently self-contradictory nature of such a
system and the basic disagreements as to its nature described above, it is with a
surprising degree of consistency that international lawyers appear to be able to
agree on what the position of international law to a particular problem is. “Hard
cases” seem to be relatively small in number; however, when such cases do present
themselves, it often appears as if a wrench was thrown into the works of the
international legal system. The age-old adage “hard cases make bad law” seems to
be particularly appropriate in international law. Studying a contentious question
of international law does not necessarily demand that a particular philosophy is
explicitly espoused by the investigator as much as it requires that all relevant legal,
practical and philosophical aspects of the problem are given due consideration and
carefully assessed before a conclusion is reached.
The question of the acceptability of humanitarian intervention—that is, the use
of military force for purportedly humanitarian ends, particularly when there is a
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lack of explicit support for such an action from the Security Council of the United
Nations—is a dilemma of international law that presents an interesting type of
“hard case” to the international lawyer. Though humanitarian intervention has
been invoked rarely, it is a controversial doctrine that has nonetheless been the
subject of much debate. Indeed, there are few questions of international law that
are as contentious as “the acceptability of military intervention for allegedly hu-
manitarian purposes.”
The goal of the present study, in general terms, is to provide an answer to the
general question of humanitarian intervention for the “occidental jurist” who is
mindful of the dangers associated with loosening the bridles on the use of force
but also recognizes the need to prevent violations of fundamental human rights.
On a more specific level, the intervention in Kosovo by NATO in 1999 serves as an
especially useful focal point for investigating the dilemmas involved in doctrines of
humanitarian intervention. The main question to be answered can thus be stated
as follows:
Taking into account the criticism that has been presented of human
rights doctrines and their application, to what extent should human-
itarian intervention be considered acceptable from the standpoint of
international law, particularly in light of the controversial Kosovo in-
tervention of 1999, and what significance as a precedent is it preferable
to afford that case with regard to future interventions?
The approach employed in this study will be a pragmatic one—pragmatic here
referring to the above-mentioned non-adherence to a given theoretical approach.
This investigation will not delve into the depths of (international) legal theory
or attempt to employ a particular fundamental method or a specific underlying
philosophy that the different schools of thought in international law would supply
in abundance. Instead, the approach is rooted in a more practical examination of
existing literature and the viewpoints presented therein; furthermore, in light of
what was noted above, the intention is to give adequate attention to those aspects
of the issue, be they legal, moral or political, that are relevant to the question at
hand.
However, the examination in the present study cannot be limited to a legal-
pragmatic assessment of a particular case. Underlying the putative right—or, as
some would allege, the duty—to intervene militarily in humanitarian crises is the
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idea of there existing a set of universal rights common to all humanity. The is-
sue of the purported universality of rights may not be immediately apparent in
the problem of humanitarian intervention, as many of the relevant norms such as
the prohibition of genocide can be said to enjoy universal support on the inter-
national arena. Nevertheless, arguments in favor of humanitarian intervention in
the absence of Security Council authorization contain unspoken implications of
“universal enforceability.” When it is argued that human rights norms have such a
position in the present system of international law that they should override the
prohibition on the use of force, at least in certain situations, the presupposition
appears to be that they represent such universal values that they can take prece-
dence over even the most fundamental rules of international law that have been
agreed upon by the international community.
In other words, if rights are to be considered “universal” and therefore of the
highest importance in international law, claims of universality must be explored in
more detail if the justifiability of actions based on universal rights is to be assessed.
Furthermore, the analysis of universality that shall be undertaken in the present
study will serve to illustrate a number of critiques of human rights doctrines and
provide a background for assessing that criticism, with particular reference to the
connection that the criticism shares with the allegations that have been made of
interventionism having been abused to serve “hegemonic” and “imperialist” ends.
Therefore, the first part of this study, Chapters Two and Three, will focus on the
intrinsic character of human rights from the perspective of their putative universal
nature. In these chapters, the universality of human rights and the effect that it
has on the enforceability of rights shall be considered; moreover, this analysis will
be linked to the practical-political criticisms that have been presented with regard
to humanitarian intervention.
This examination will serve as background for Chapters Four and Five, wherein
humanitarian intervention is examined from a perspective that is more legal in
nature. It is here that the Kosovo problem is subjected to more detailed scrutiny.
How “legal” or how “justified” was the Kosovo intervention—or, more precisely,
what position should one adopt with regard to that intervention, keeping in mind
the criticism and the problems assessed in the previous chapters? In Chapter Six,
concluding observations will be made with respect to the main question described
above.
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2 Immoral Crimes Since Immemorial Times
The question of the universality of rights is more relevant to the problem of hu-
manitarian intervention than would appear at first sight. It appears that the issue
is raised relatively infrequently in debates regarding humanitarian intervention;
however, one needs to acknowledge that the persuasive nature of modern human
rights doctrines owes a lot to the way in which rights are portrayed as protect-
ing the universal needs of humanity. The consensus permeating the international
arena—at least as seen from a Western perspective—is such that statements that
are critical of the purportedly empowering, liberating, impartial and universal na-
ture of rights are easy to consider inappropriate or at least are tempting to look
down upon or ignore.
What is relevant here is how this Zeitgeist may often contribute to creating a bi-
ased atmosphere where arguments based on the language of human rights may
attain more credibility than they would otherwise have. The unspoken—but not
uncriticized—assumption, it appears, is that actions justified by reference to hu-
man rights doctrines are by default preferable to other alternatives; i.e., that rights,
through their universal nature, protect the “greater good” of the global commu-
nity, and any detrimental effects that result from their implementation may only
be considered an implementation-level problem. Furthermore, arguments for in-
tervention are not invulnerable to criticisms of their connection to liberal Western
thinking. Sidestepping relativist objections to human rights doctrines leads to a
limited view of the issue wherein similar objections to intervention doctrines are
ignored.1 Therefore, when one chooses a starting point for examining humanitar-
ian intervention, it is more than appropriate to elect to consider the root of the
doctrines that are employed as justification and are thus inextricably intertwined
with the main problem—namely, doctrines of the universality of rights.
The question, then, is whether human rights constitute a truly universal doctrine
common to all mankind or whether they carry a culturally specific background
and philosophy—and if there is such a cultural bias, to what extent it exists. This
is a wide-ranging question which has been subject to intensive debate. Arguments
in favor of the universality of human rights often make reference to the Univer-
1Relativist objections to humanitarian intervention are considered in particular in Tesón 2003,
p. 100–102. Tesón criticizes such arguments through what appears to be a reductio ad absurdum;
furthermore, he points out that objections to intervention that are based on the Western origin
of rights are unconvincing because the justifiability of an argument is not dependent upon its
historical genesis.
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sal Declaration of Human Rights that was drafted in the aftermath of the Second
World War and which has been said to form the basis of the “ideology” of the
United Nations,2 if such a notion can be considered to exist. Representatives of dif-
ferent nations and cultures participated in the process of drafting the Declaration,
and the argument has been that the Declaration would thus reflect an adequate
consensus on the content of those rights.3 However, notable opposing views were
presented to some provisions in the Declaration, such as the right to divorce which
was opposed by Arab representatives. Nonetheless, those parts of the Declaration
that are likely to serve as a basis for humanitarian intervention, and the provisions
of subsequent documents that are relevant to the present study—in particular,
the prohibition of genocide as defined in the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide—are relatively uncontested in the world
at large. It could be argued that it was the recurrence of such atrocities that the
United Nations was first and foremost created to prevent.4
Arguments of cultural relativism are not the only form of criticism that has been
leveled against human rights treaties and norms. In fact, claims have been made
that human rights are a doctrine that somehow seems to belong more appropri-
ately to the sphere of morals and ethics than the sphere of law. Moreover, there has
been criticism of the problems that codifying human rights into laws and treaties
necessarily, it is alleged, seems to entail.5 Whether codification has been bene-
ficial or not is evidently a matter of debate, as is the problem of whether that
question should be assessed from the point of view of human rights ideology it-
self or from an external perspective. The problems of codification are also related
to arguments and counter-arguments of cultural relativism: i.e., whether all cul-
tural practices are equally justifiable or whether certain conceptions of morals and
ethics are in some way preferable to others. Interesting questions have been raised,
for example, with regard to the “Asian values” problem. It has been claimed that
human rights as they are currently codified in treaties are actually manifestations
of individualistic Western values and that they do not take into account the com-
munitarian nature of Asian cultures where societal order is given precedence over
2For discussion of human rights as not only an ideology but as a “secular religion,” see Chap-
ter 2.2 of the present study.
3Ignatieff 2001, p. 64. However, cf. Douzinas 2000, p. 122–124: “The traveaux préparatoires he
used to prepare his draft came, with only two exceptions, from Western English language sources
with the American Law Institute submission a main influence. Only one of the seven principal
drafters was not Christian [. . . ]”
4Cf. the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations; see p. 49 of the present study.
5See e.g. Allott 1999, p. 47: “The emergence of potentially universal values after 1945 [. . . ]
suffered a deformation [. . . ] They were also systematically corrupted before they could acquire a
more clearly universal substance, so that they became vulnerable to charges of cultural relativism
and hegemonism.”
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the well-being of individuals.6 Furthermore, there have been feminist arguments
against human rights that point to the way in which rights doctrines—and inter-
ventions based on human rights ideology—fail to take into account the needs of
women as a gender group.7 In this chapter, the implications of such arguments
from the perspective of the applicability of human rights are examined so that the
issues raised can be considered with regard to the main problem.
2.1 Uncommon Contempt for Common Content
The position that human rights are given in the system of international law de-
pends on the writer. To name but a few examples, they can be considered sim-
ply a contractual obligation, a jus cogens norm in international law or one of the
fundamental building blocks—or even the most fundamental building block—of
international law. Allott examines the fundamentals of international society and
considers the possibility of certain common values, possibly reflected in human
rights norms, serving the common interest of international society. In his view, one
of the main social functions of law is that “law inserts the common interest of so-
ciety into the behaviour of society-members.”8 Furthermore, Allott considers law
a “universalizing system, re-conceiving the infinite particularity of human willing
and acting, in the light of the common interest of society.”9 Thus, from this per-
spective, the common interest of international society is, or should be, served by
the system of international law, and the present writer contends that human rights,
to the extent that they can be considered a defensible system of norms, should be
seen as part of this endeavor.
One way of rephrasing such an approach in the form of a question would be to
ask what values constitute the minimum for international society to function suc-
cessfully. The ban on the use of force was specifically designed to avoid new major
armed conflicts that would come with immense cost to international society and
its members, and therefore the underlying purpose of the Charter system could
be seen as the supporting of this goal.10 To this end, one can assess the idea of
6For discussion and debate on this viewpoint on a general level, see the Introduction to The East
Asian Challenge for Human Rights by Bauer and Bell 1999, p. 3–23.
7See e.g. the discussion on Orford 2003 and Charlesworth & Chinkin in Chapters 3.1 and 3.2
of the present study, respectively.
8Allott 1999, p. 30 and p. 36–37.
9Allott 1999, p. 32.
10See Ch. 4 of the present study for a more detailed discussion on the prohibition on the use of
force.
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human rights as a doctrine that enables international society to function in an
effective manner.11
The creation of the United Nations and the instituting of the Charter system was
followed by the national liberation movements of Africa, among others, and the
process of decolonization.12 From this point of view, those human rights provi-
sions in the Charter and the Declaration that guarantee the equality of different
ethnic groups are of paramount importance. Nations are built upon ideas of eth-
nicity and history,13 and in the modern world it would thus be hard to imagine an
international order where one ethnic group could be held in a lower position than
others or where such an approach could be effectively tolerated by members of
the international society. For example, after the colonies in Africa gained indepen-
dence, the repression of certain ethnic groups—particularly those that comprised
the majority in the newly independent nations—became politically difficult and in
the end impossible for any country in the world.14 As early as the 1960s, world
public opinion and the international society took a critical position towards the
lack of civil rights of people of African-American descent in the United States, a
development that may have been unavoidable due to the fact that independent
nations where the majority of the population was of similar ethnic heritage had
come into existence.15
One can also contrast this situation with the provisions of the Charter intended to
protect the equality of the sexes and the right to marry freely. There are no coun-
tries where the population is all-female or all-male16 and there exist no countries
that would have been established on the idea or ideology of freedom of marriage.
Therefore, protecting those human rights on the international arena will unavoid-
ably prove more difficult than making successfully implementable provisions for
11Cf. the conclusion of Meron 2000, p. 278, with regard to the discrepancy between humani-
tarian norms and reality and the need for a common system of values: “Public opinion and the
social consensus that have proved so effective in the development of the law should be geared to
transforming practice as well. For that, the creation of a culture of values is indispensable.”
12See e.g. Ignatieff 2001, p. 6.
13The United States may be one of the few countries originally founded on a political idea in-
stead of ethnic or historical concepts. In any case, see e.g. Douzinas 2000, p. 131: “Nations owe
their legitimacy to myths of origin, narratives of victory and defeat, borders and imagined or real
historical continuities but not to humanity.”
14Furthermore, as both Cold War-era superpowers wanted to gain a foothold in the Third World,
they wished to establish good relations with those states—something that required the adoption
of new doctrines of equality.
15This is also demonstrated in the apparent fact that the fall of apartheid in South Africa may
have been unavoidable in the long term—something that was understood within the leadership of
the country as well. See e.g. Mandela 1994/1995, p. 660.
16With the notable exception of the Holy See (i.e., the Vatican), which wields considerable influ-
ence.
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the equality of different human “races.”17 It is difficult to see how the international
order could function efficiently or effectively if racism was permitted and openly
accepted in the current framework of international law. African nations and other
nations that have been afflicted by the idea that certain ethnic groups are inher-
ently inferior to others would be extremely reluctant to participate in a system
that denied the rights of the people they represent.18
On the other hand, it must be noted that the efficiency of a system does nothing
to make it morally justifiable from the perspective of a given set of moral stan-
dards. To take an example from a state-internal level, Singapore is a highly effi-
cient industrialized society with a low crime rate even though the policies of the
Singaporean government do not correspond to a European view of human rights
or democracy. Such examples illustrate the fact that concepts of “efficiency” are
not necessarily universal. Nevertheless, the present writer is of the opinion that
the goal of effectiveness—i.e., the ability to function in the first place—must be
kept separate from the concept of efficiency, and it is effectiveness that is a neces-
sary feature and reflects a kind of “common interest” in the system of international
law.19
As the moral universality of human rights has been challenged on many grounds—
e.g., on the basis of cultural relativism, feminist criticism and numerous or even
innumerable others—considerations such as the ones expressed above might help
define the applicability of the language of human rights more clearly. After all, as
Ignatieff points out, the vocabulary of human rights led to the colonial and civil
rights revolution.20 Of course, it could be argued that it was not (only) the lan-
guage and philosophy of human rights as stipulated in the Charter but the social
and political realities of the postwar era that set in motion the process of decol-
onization and the civil rights revolution in the West. However, these two things
cannot be detached from each other: human rights are an inseparable facet of
the post-1945 international reality. In other words, the fact that rights language
was codified and given a kind of an “official” position in the Charter and in other
sources was something that did not happen in a vacuum; it was only a manifesta-
17Interestingly, “racism” is a meaningful concept in spite of—or possibly because of—the fact
that races are nowadays usually understood to be a social construction.
18The former colonies gaining independence may be seen as an empowering chain of events
from the point of view of the peoples those nations represent; furthermore, it can be argued that
the Western civil rights revolution might not have taken place if the colonial revolution hadn’t
transpired.
19When a distinction is made between effectiveness and efficiency, the first may be used as in “an
effective normative system” as per Kelsen, the latter as in “economically efficient” as per Pareto.
20Ignatieff 2001, p. 6.
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tion of the outrage created by the atrocities of the Second World War. One could
even put forward the thesis that this development might have been more or less
inevitable—i.e., human rights had to come into existence due to the events that
had transpired and due to the impending end of the colonial era.21
Nevertheless, claims that human rights are necessarily a Western—or Eurocen-
tric—creation and an expression of individualistic Western values can only be said
to have intensified in recent years.22 Leino-Sandberg has looked at the problem
of the universality vs. particularity of human rights especially from a European
point of view, which illustrates this criticism very visibly.23 A precise definition
of “Europe” is an impossible task and recent attempts at formulating a tangible
description of “Europeanness” have been more cultural than geographical.24 It
appears that human rights language is portrayed as being at the core of being
“European” while that same ideology is also presented as universal.25 Different
solutions have been suggested for this dilemma, and it is more or less overt that the
most common solution is to convey an image of human rights being a European—
or Western—responsibility,26 i.e., a type of “white man’s burden.” This argument
thus assumes that human rights are truly universal—that is, it is Europeans who
simply happened to discover them first and it is Europeans or Westerners who are
21For example, Ignatieff notes that human rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights were “not an expression of European imperial self-confidence but a war-weary gener-
ation’s reflection on European nihilism and its consequences.” Ignatieff 2001, p. 4. Thus, human
rights could also be interpreted as a result of the Western fatigue with warfare. Note that the state-
ment here that human rights “had” to come into existence is not meant to imply that a deterministic
view of history needs to be adhered to: instead, the point is that such a development may have
been more likely than some would assume.
22A number of commentators have made reference to Pollis—Schwab 1979, considered by some
to be a seminal example of this type of criticism. Unfortunately, the present writer has been unable
to examine the original reference; thus, its influence and content shall not be discussed here in
further detail.
23Leino-Sandberg 2005.
24Cf. Leino-Sandberg 2005, p. 40–41. Problems involved with defining “Europe” include the
distinction betweenWestern and Eastern Europe and the “Eastern border” of Europe—furthermore,
with the enlargement of the EU, questions of the “Europeanness” of Turkey have come to the fore.
Leino-Sandberg 2005, p. 41, notes that “[d]efining Europe with reference to common values [. . . ]
followed more closely political than geographical borders” (emphasis here).
25Leino-Sandberg 2005, p. 45–47. According to Leino-Sandberg, p. 46, “the particular (the EU)
invokes the universal language mainly in order to promote its own objectives.”
26Leino-Sandberg 2005, p. 41, where it is pointed out that in 1986, the EC member states
adopted a statement on human rights, emphasizing “their special responsibility as Europeans”—a
view that has only intensified in recent years. According to Leino-Sandberg, these concepts are
often used for political ends. Cf. Douzinas 2000, p. 125: “the official political purpose behind the
“agenda” was to present a rosy European picture, to link aid and trade to Western human rights
priorities and to give European representatives in international bodies something to say, as one del-
egate put it, when Europe was (justifiably allegedly) criticising others for human rights violations
and was (unjustifiably) attacked in return for applying double standards.”
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to carry on a proselytizing or enforcing mission in the rest of the world or at least
within the Western sphere of influence.
However, it is surprisingly rarely that the question of the empirical vs. moral uni-
versality of rights is explicitly discussed. From the occasionally implied empir-
ical viewpoint, human rights are to be defined as something that is “already”
universal—that is, as rights the defining feature of which is that they are—and
by implication, have been—applicable anywhere and at any time in all societies.
Instead of “Are human rights universal?” the question to be posed would thus be
“What rights can be considered universal?” This position carries the presupposi-
tion that human rights are not (only) seen as a goal that one should strive for but
as a set of rules to be determined through an empirical endeavor.
The question of the empirical universality of rights is a perspective that highlights
one the major problems with the Declaration and human rights discourse in gen-
eral: how can a declaration that prohibits certain actions and calls for equivalent
rights for all people(s) purport to be “universal,” if the very reason for its drafting
has been the fact that those rights have been (consistently or even universally) vio-
lated in the past? In other words, if the purpose of the Declaration was to prevent
certain violations of certain putative rights from transpiring as had happened in
the past, how can those rights be termed “universal?” To rephrase this once more,
it seems that the massive violations of human rights in the past and the present—
and most likely in the future as well—make apparent that the universal nature of
these rights is not related to their empirical universality in the present—instead,
it appears that the supporters of human rights would like to see them as empiri-
cal universals in the future, as they consider them moral universals in the present.
Douzinas states that the “empirical universality of human rights is not a normative
principle.”27 One should keep in mind that it is this relationship between moral
and empirical universality that is precisely the issue: to take a banal example, how
can torture be called universally immoral and therefore something that should
be banned, if it is a practice that has been taking place since time immemorial
around the globe? Such statements appear to conform to an extreme version of
Hume’s Guillotine:28 not only is it considered inappropriate to deduce what ought
from what is, but what ought is in fact decreed to be the diametrical opposite of
what is.
27Douzinas 2000, p. 117.
28According to Hume’s Guillotine, one cannot directly deduce moral rules from empirical facts.
The maxim was originally put forward by Hume in 1739 under the rubric “Moral Distinctions not
Deriv’d from Reason.” See Hume 1739/1978.
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The above-considered line of argumentation appears to serve as evidence of hu-
man rights being a doctrine that is more culturally specific than many would
concede. Claiming that Europeans simply “came up” with these universal human
rights “first”29 is not a convincing argument. Were human rights akin to the phys-
ical laws of nature or the rules of mathematics, simply existing “somewhere out
there” waiting to be discovered (if we suppose that these are things that are truly
universal; some do not agree with this, but the present author is definitely not one
of them),30 then the argument of human rights being “discovered” by the West
would be quite a valid one. However, the considerations above—and the histori-
cal background of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—demonstrate that
human rights language and doctrines should be seen as normative universals, i.e.,
something that somebody wishes to see as universal, not something that is uni-
versal from a more objective standpoint. Therefore, the argument of “white man’s
burden,”31 which seems to be more prevalent in European thinking than would
initially appear, at least in the background if not on the surface, is one that does
not hold water. Even though this is a relatively straightforward counter-argument,
the problematic assumption can still be seen “between the lines” in many positions
that have been presented on the universality of human rights.
If one does opt to define human rights through what is truly “universal,” one can-
not expect to end up with a list of rights that has more than a few select items.
It is extremely unlikely, for example, that the equality of the sexes or the right to
marry freely would be found on such a list of “true” empirical universals. What
one could perhaps find on that list would be the prohibition of genocide. Even
though it is true that genocide has been committed in the past with unfortunate
frequency, it is quite difficult to imagine a cultural, ethnic or political group or
a nation that would officially voice its support for genocidal policies or defend
the idea of genocide on the international arena. Nazi Germany and the Soviet
Union under Stalin did not publicly proclaim to be following policies of genocide,
most likely because of the international outrage and universal condemnation that
it would have caused.32 Similarly, the atrocities that have taken place in the for-
mer Yugoslavia in the 1990s—as in the Kosovo case—have often been denied by
the alleged perpetrators and their supporters. Of course, the fact that genocide is
29Cf. Leino-Sandberg 2005, p. 40–47.
30Certain writers in the fields of philosophy and sociology of science appear to have denied the
existence of an objective “reality” that is “waiting to be discovered”—an approach that seems to
have seeped through to other fields as well and appears to be quite widespread today.
31Cf. e.g. Leino-Sandberg 2005, p. 43.
32Evidence of the outrage caused by such atrocities can be seen in the eagerness to deny the
historicity of the Holocaust in certain circles.
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something that no nation, state or group wants to support officially may be at-
tributable to the fact that it is a rule that can turn against that nation or group
itself.33 Nevertheless, it seems that the prohibition of genocide would be on the
list of “universal universals,” if such a list were to be compiled.
Concluding observation. Human rights doctrines can be motivated through certain
universal requirements—namely, the common interest of the world community
and the ability of the international system to function effectively. Still, the ex-
tent and content of human rights is far from being universally agreed upon, let
alone implemented, when examined in historical-empirical terms. This fact, how-
ever, does not lead to all rules being particularist: specifically, the universality of
the prohibition of genocide is rather difficult to argue against. Nevertheless, ar-
guments of universal human rights having been “discovered” by the West—which
would give certain credence to the notion of the West being in the moral position
of a championer or enforcer of those rights—can be considered untenable.
2.2 Human Rights: (A) Pretty Universal?
The question of whether human rights are universal is a problem that is connected
to the question of the apparent goals of the proponents of rights doctrines and
the effects of rights advocacy and humanitarian interventions. Are human rights
promoted by the West so that the living conditions of people in developing nations
and around the world could be improved, or are they a fiendish ploy to re-establish
Western hegemony and imperialism in the Third World, or something in between?
History has shown that hegemonic actors on the world arena often justify their
actions either implicitly or explicitly in terms of universality, that is, purporting to
represent a universal ‘pacifying’ force (cf. pax romana); the problem is, therefore,
to what extent this problem is apparent in modern doctrines of human rights and
humanitarian intervention.
According to Charlesworth & Chinkin, human rights are a product of the post-WWII
international legal order and have developed mainly from the values of Western,
Judeo-Christian morality—in other words, human rights doctrines appear to be a
particularist enterprise as discussed in the previous section.34 This is a criticism
33In other words, if a nation contended that genocidal policies are acceptable, it would be diffi-
cult for it to put forward arguments condemning such policies if they were to be directed against
that nation itself in the future. Cf. the peremptory norm of self-defense discussed below on p. 42
of this study.
34Charlesworth—Chinkin 2000, p. 201–202.
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that is often echoed elsewhere: the argument is that the Charter system was a
tool central to legitimizing the post-war order, as is stated by Douzinas,35 and that
human rights, along with the use of force doctrines that emphasized sovereignty,
were in that process designed to serve the agendas of the major powers. This
argument does carry a certain degree of validity. However, this writer is of the
view that these problems are an unavoidable drawback of current human rights
doctrines. It would appear that the atrocities of WWII created a “window of op-
portunity” where the international political situation, with a great war just having
ended and with two major powers capable of effecting profound change in inter-
national law, was ripe for a shift—the establishment of a new system where not
only was waging war restricted but where the new language of “universal” rights
could be employed in the fundamental documents of that system. The fact that
the Soviet Union participated in the drafting of the Declaration and the fact that
representatives of other cultures took part as mentioned previously should be evi-
dence of this initial “breakthrough” of human rights in international law not being
an entirely Western creation, even though human rights language may very well
have been invoked numerous times in support of arguably dubious actions taken
by Western powers—a fact that may be at the root of the motivations of the critical
stance held by Charlesworth, Chinkin and other critics.36
Further challenges to the Western bias that the Declaration has been criticized for
appear to come from the Islamic values argument, particularly with reference to
marital rights, and the Asian values position, which emphasizes the communitar-
ian nature of Asian cultures in contrast to the ostensibly individualistic nature of
Western cultures and Western rights.37 In particular, countries such as the People’s
Republic of China and Singapore have maintained that their cultures place more
emphasis on the maintenance of societal order instead of individual rights. These
arguments follow the logic of cultural relativism: all, or at least some, cultural
values are seen as being on equal footing from a moral-ethical standpoint, and
the claim that some values are superior or at least preferable—and thus univer-
35Douzinas 2000, p. 118.
36However, it is interesting how Marxist thinking is usually portrayed as an antithesis to the
West, even though it was (at least initially) an European idea, conceived by a German living in
England, in response to European developments—and later championed by the Soviet Union, the
Czarist predecessor of which has historically been considered a major European power. For exam-
ple, Douzinas 2000, p. 123, points out that “[t]he social democratic component of the Declaration
consisted in a number of economic, social and cultural rights which, according to Cassese, “consid-
erably reduced the impact of Western ideas by securing approval for some fundamental postulates
of the Marxist ideology.” ” (emphasis added)
37The present writer cannot resist the temptation to point out that opponents of the Asian values
argument could dub that position the “Oriental Fallacy” in honor of the Italian author Oriana
Fallaci, who has recently re-entered the public spotlight as a controversial critic of Islam.
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sally enforceable—to others is thereby rejected. Moreover, the Islamic argument
also emphasizes the failure of Western human rights to protect women from pros-
titution, pornography and other ills that those rights were designed to provide
protection from. Thus, cultural arguments against human rights ideologies are not
only based on arguments of cultural relativism but also on the efficiency of Western
human rights thinking or the lack thereof in certain cases.38
However, it is only natural that arguments of cultural relativism—or cultural ex-
ceptionalism, i.e., arguments of certain cultures having moral standards that take
precedence over “universal” human rights—can also work in the opposite direc-
tion. On the one hand, enforcing the rights of women in Afghanistan would seem
to be in conflict with traditional Islamic morals, but on the other hand, the pro-
hibition of torture may sometimes appear to be secondary to the protection of
public security in certain Western nations. The gist of these arguments appears to
be that human rights doctrines fail to take into account the special cultural, his-
torical, social and other circumstances in some societies. Franck provides several
arguments against such exceptionalism.39 Of particular interest is his assertion
that human rights have enjoyed widespread acceptance in non-Western societies.
In other words, the exceptionalist argument seems to be far from being universally
or even widely accepted around the world.40
As for the criticism that human rights doctrines can be used to further “impe-
rialist” and other seemingly nefarious ends, it also holds true that relativist ex-
ceptionalism provides opportunities for abuse as well. Examples of this include,
for example, the oppression of minorities or women in certain countries as well
as the aforementioned rejection of the prohibition of torture. What apparently is
common to all these arguments is the fact that they are the proverbial two-edged
sword. While human rights ideology can be abused, so can its counter-ideologies.
Moreover, those who appeal to exceptionalism are not necessarily those whose
well-being is allegedly being protected by exceptionalism (cf. Franck41); in fact, it
would seem that exceptionalist arguments lend themselves to abuse more easily
than human rights arguments do. On the other hand, the definition of “abuse” nec-
essarily presupposes a certain conception of morality: one cannot argue that the
Taliban’s repression of women was an “abuse” of the idea of taking into account
38Cf. discussion on efficiency and effectiveness above, p. 8.
39Franck 2001.
40See e.g. the Asian pro-rights contributions in The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights.
41Franck 2001, p. 196–197.
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cultural differences unless one clings onto a wider definition of “repression” that
applies outside the local culture.42
Franck also argues that human rights culture is a product of recent developments
that are global in character.43 The revolutionary changes that have taken place
in the past century, particularly the industrial and communication revolutions
(among others mentioned by Franck), have brought about new situations where
old morals and philosophies may no longer be valid—or, at least, additional ones
(or at the very least, refinement and reappraisal of the old ones) may be required.
Wars have always taken place throughout history, but it was only in the 20th Cen-
tury that they turned into genocide on an unprecedented scale and into rapid,
organized mass slaughter of entire ethnic groups. The reasons for this may be
hard to deduce, but the assessment may be made that industrialization and the
communication revolution played a major role in such developments. Such global
changes and the “one world” that has resulted may necessitate the creation of
new, global moral doctrines; cultural exceptionalism would be a step away from
that direction.
Moreover, as Franck points out, it was in the West that these developments ini-
tially took place, but they weren’t caused by Western culture.44 However, it might
be appropriate to refine this statement a bit—these developments weren’t caused
by Western culture per se, but they were set in motion by a relatively rapid se-
ries of events that were precipitated by Western culture, i.e., the development of
mercantilism, capitalism, the Enlightment and the technological revolution that
followed, et cetera. Nevertheless, it is relatively easy to concur with Franck’s view
that these arguments are “unlikely to carry weight [. . . ] with those whose claim
of cultural exceptionalism is only a flimsy disguise for totalitarian tendencies.”45
Indeed, those parties are unlikely to be convinced by any arguments; for example,
if one considers the Islamic rulers of Iran, arguments of cultural exceptionalism
on their part are more likely to be an argumentative strategy through which their
42Nevertheless, it must be stated that extreme relativism is unlikely to be considered a particu-
larly convincing argument by many. For example, see Tesón 2003, p. 102–108 and p. 129: “[E]ven
a cursory look at history unmasks non-intervention as the one doctrine whose origin, design, and
effect is to protect established political power and render persons defenseless against the worst
forms of human evil.”
43Franck 2001, p. 198–201.
44Ibid. The reasons for the fact that European nations—instead of other regions of the world—
advanced so rapidly have been widely debated; one recent argument is made in Diamond 1997,
where it is asserted that geographical factors were ultimately the deciding factor in the “rise of the
West.”
45Franck 2001, p. 202.
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actions are justified to others rather than something that they employ to convince
themselves of the justifiability of their policies.
Douzinas makes the shrewd observation that cultural relativism is potentially even
more murderous than extreme universalism.46 His statement that respect for cul-
tural differences has often “turned into a shield protecting appalling local prac-
tices” rings true in an unfortunately relevant and timely manner. One only needs
to look at places such as Iran with the abysmal situation with women’s rights and
certain African nations with the practice of female genital mutilation to see some
examples of relativist positions being used to justify actions that the global com-
munity would not tolerate if strict human rights standards were to be applied to
countries outside the Western sphere of influence. Nevertheless, the relativistic
viewpoint is not illogical in itself—but only when it is considered separate from
the realities of the international arena. For example, there is nothing in female
genital mutilation that would make it a universally abhorrent practice as such;
outrage and condemnation only stems from a specific set of moral rules and cul-
tural assumptions, and no matter how widespread that condemnation might be,
issues such as the ban on female genital mutilation and women’s suffrage cannot
be put in the same group of “universal” moral principles to which the prohibition
of genocide would belong.47 To put it another way, moral conceptions and values
are not either universal or non-universal, but could be placed along a continuum
between entirely particular and possibly completely universal principles accepted
by all mankind. It could be argued that female genital mutilation is a practice that
is not placeable at the extreme end of universality where it could be said to be
universally condemned, as that is not the case. Nevertheless, in light of the exam-
ples above and with reference to Douzinas’ statement, it seems safe to state that
cultural relativism is an argument that is easier to misuse or abuse—whichever
definition of “abuse” is adopted—than moral universalism.
Still, one must appreciate the fact that a certain idea of morality necessarily pre-
supposes a certain system of ethics and morals. For example, intervening at any
price to stop atrocities in Kosovo may be ethical from the point of view of Western
states, but it may be impossible to draw a line between advancing purely national
46Douzinas 2000, p. 137.
47Of course, the ban on female genital mutilation is something that the present writer strongly
agrees with, but it is not a norm that would protect the existence of international society and
its ability to function in the same way as the ban on genocide does; furthermore, if the present
system of international law had been based on the legal cultures of societies where that practice
has historically been widespread, there would undoubtedly be little unanimity with respect to the
need to ban it.
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interests—which is what China and Russia, it has been argued,48 were doing in
preventing the Security Council from approving the Kosovo operation—and fol-
lowing one’s moral and ethical principles (possibly in the form of “patriotism”)
which could place national interests above other considerations. For example, the
1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia is one dangerous example of the Pandora’s
box that the easing of the restrictions on intervention might open, and it serves
as a good example here as well: from the point of view of Communist ethics, the
Warsaw Pact intervention in 1968 would have been justified because it helped pre-
serve the Socialist bloc, the original underlying philosophy of which was at least
supposed to be to advance the living conditions of the disadvantaged people of
the world.49
To continue to employ the Czechoslovakia case as an example, it can be argued
that such arguments in favor of the Warsaw Pact action are not swayed even by the
fact that the Warsaw Pact failed to live up to its own principles: one could justify
the operation by saying that cementing Soviet power in Eastern Europe was the
underlying goal, and that this “nationalist” or “imperialist” ethic—in itself no more
or no less justifiable and acceptable than any other system of ethics—had to be
dressed up in the language of Socialist principles so that it would appear more
justifiable to the world community. These examples illustrate that resort to ethical
principles is necessarily equivalent to treading down a slippery slope: when one
slides down into the world of ethical arguments, it is difficult to avoid ending up
with an “anything goes” approach. A general “turn to ethics” in international law
among those writers who are unwilling to stick to the strict letter of Charter law is
a trend that is according to Koskenniemi part of a more general trend since the end
of the Cold War and carries “profoundly conservative” implications.50 Whether or
not one agrees with this assessment, the pragmatic observation should be made
here that there are problems of the most fundamental kind with the justification
of positions of international law by way of strong moral or ethical arguments.
Moreover, criticism of universal human rights as a “set of moral trump cards”
or a “world-wide secular religion,” which has been discussed by Ignatieff among
others,51 is quite valid indeed. In the opinion of the present author, the possibility
of “religionness”52 is exactly the danger with trying to promote human rights as
all-encompassing “super-arguments.” When human rights are removed from the
48See the reference to Hannikainen on p. 54 of the present study.
49See also p. 74 of the present study.
50Koskenniemi 2002, p. 160.
51Ignatieff 2001, p. 21 and 75, inter alia.
52That is, of being religion-like (cf. ‘religiousness’ or even ‘religiosity.’)
17
realm of politics53 and become a religion of sorts that requires no justification and
can by itself be used to justify more or less anything, they can become either a
tool of apologism for the use of force by powerful nations or simply meaningless
wordplay that is ignored by the world at large.
Additionally, the problem with treating human rights as “moral trump cards” or
the ultimate overarching moral system that stands above everything else is that
it exacerbates the general problem of using doctrines of morality and religion as
arguments. In other words, the problem is the fact that certain values and ideas
are abstracted away into unquestionable, axiomatic “Ur-principles” whose valid-
ity cannot even be discussed or called into question. The Abrahamic religions—
Judaism, Christianity and Islam—which had their genesis in the Middle East serve
as excellent examples of this problem: certain moral principles—relating to food,
sexuality and other areas of life—were set down thousands of years ago for sound
reasons, namely, to maintain a society that functions (effectively), but because
they were elevated into the sphere of religion, even today there exist groups of
considerable influence that refuse to acknowledge that some of these principles
might be antiquated and in need of revision.
To take an even more stereotypical example, the American Revolution resulted
in the right to bear arms being promoted to the position of an inalienable civil
liberty that is guaranteed in the United States Constitution, considered by some to
be a “sacred document” which cannot be altered. Now that society is faced with
changed circumstances, it would arguably be a reasonable course of action to alter
or possibly even revoke the right to bear arms, but it is highly unrealistic to expect
such reforms to be implementable today.
Such issues with the very concept of unalterable “moral trump cards” not only
result in obsolete norms harming society in the future but also cause the erosion
of the credibility of other norms in the same system. This is the very problem
that human rights also face if they become a “religion,” that is, a set of unques-
tionable moral principles that are supposed to be held as universal, eternal and
unchangeable. Furthermore, as Ignatieff points out, viewing human rights as a
kind of secular religion or an object of “idolatry” can raise doubts among religious
non-Westerners.54 This is particularly true when one considers the Western his-
53Ignatieff 2001, p. 21.
54Ignatieff 2001, p. 53.
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tory, if not necessarily the alleged Western content, of human rights ideologies.55
In light of what has been stated above, Ignatieff’s thesis of human rights gaining
more credence if they were more political, i.e., if they were “a discourse for ad-
judication of conflicts” instead of an untouchable object of idolatry is something
that is worth considering.56
At this point, one needs reconsider the implications of the argument that the uni-
versality of human rights could be denied by asserting that human rights doctrines
are a representation of Western individualism. The allegations of “individualism”
are a feature that seems to be central to many cultural relativist criticisms of hu-
man rights. Along with genocide, the prohibition of racism and the ban on the
oppression of ethnic groups are the most important tenets of human rights doc-
trines today, as has been discussed previously with regard to the effectiveness of
the current system of international law. It is difficult to imagine an international
society where peoples with different ethnic backgrounds could effectively cooper-
ate if the equality of persons between those ethnic groups was not guaranteed at
least in principle in the basic rules that the international community has defined
for itself. What is important here is that it would seem that the most convincing
arguments against racism—if the necessity of the ban on racism in international
society is not accepted as an unquestionable a priori principle, as should not be
done in the opinion of this writer—are individualistic in nature. It is difficult to
find academic arguments in favor of racism today, and the entire issue appears
moot from a modern point of view, even though related controversies are ongoing
in many nations around the globe. Nevertheless, it seems that the main argument
for racism, as absurd as an “argument for racism” may seem in the modern world,
is an anti-individualistic one while the main argument against it is individualistic
in character.57
To elaborate upon this problem, it appears to the present writer that racism, ethnic
segregation and similar practices lead to situations that can be considered unjust
55It is the personal opinion of the present writer that human rights doctrines may be in danger of
becoming the major “religion” to have its genesis in the West, and humanitarian advocates would
thus be well advised to avoid making theology out of international law.
56Ignatieff 2001, p. 20–21. According to Ignatieff, “it is an illusion to suppose that the function of
human rights is to define a higher realm of shared moral values that will assist contending parties
to find common ground [. . . ] The larger illusion I want to criticize is the that human rights is above
politics [. . . ]”
57See e.g. Pinker 2002, p. 145: “[T]he case against bigotry is not a factual claim that humans are
biologically indistinguishable. It is a moral stance that condemns judging an individual according
to the average traits of certain groups.”
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mainly from the point of view of the individual.58 Due to historical, cultural and
other reasons, different ethnic and cultural groups often have divergent levels of
participation and varying levels of success in different societies. As is well known,
one ethnic group may have integrated itself into society very well and attained a
high level of education—for example, the “model minorities” consisting of people
of East Asian and Jewish descent in North America. On the other hand, there may
be ethnic groups that have, due to cultural or other factors, failed to fulfil the
“expectations” of the majority population or the definition of “success” defined by
the majority. One example of such a group would be the Roma people in Europe—
and the unfortunate fact is that there is no shortage of examples. Discrimination
against such groups may be one of the most prevalent forms of racism in modern
society. The unjustness that such discrimination creates can be considered to be at
the core of anti-racist arguments. However, that unjustness is primarily manifested
at the individual level: if one wanted to justify such discrimination, one could
put forward the argument that members of these cultural and ethnic groups are
simply being treated in accordance with the societal position of their group. In
other words, arguments in favor of discrimination are valid in a collectivist sense,
while arguments against discrimination are valid in an individualist sense.59
In light of the above, the following argument may be put forward: firstly, if the pro-
hibition of ethnic discrimination is so deeply at the center of the international legal
system that racism cannot be justified in any way within that system; secondly, if
the prohibition in question is one of the few tenets of human rights that has uni-
versal acceptance internationally; and thirdly, if the rationale for that prohibition
is based on individualistic principles; then, it must follow that individualistic argu-
ments are universally acceptable. Therefore, criticism of the individualism of hu-
man rights cannot in itself invalidate the global applicability of rights doctrines on
the international arena; however, this fact in itself does not in turn invalidate the
criticism that has been leveled against human rights in general and humanitarian
intervention in particular by commentators who adhere to the non-individualist
viewpoint.
58From this point of view, it is interesting to ponder the fact that while it would obviously be
in violation of human rights ideology to provide certain persons with special rights based on their
membership in a group, such as an ethnic or a social group, there is still nothing wrong with the
idea of conferring rights on a group of individuals on the basis of them belonging to a biological
group—namely, that of humans. In other words, the basic idea of human rights seems to be inter-
nally contradictory due to the fact that it is individualist and collectivist at the same time. What
implications this might have on the fundamental justifiability of human rights is a provocative
avenue of argumentation that may be best left unexplored.
59Further evidence of this may be that non-individualistic East Asian societies have often been
alleged to suffer from serious problems with racism—the ban on which is individualistic.
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Concluding observation. Arguments against the universal character of human rights
have been posited that are particularly persuasive with regard to the problems they
identify in the particularity inherent in rights discourse and the alleged failure
of rights doctrines to effectively protect certain groups. Nonetheless, it can be
stated that exceptionalist and relativist arguments lend themselves to abuse more
easily than the vocabulary of universal human rights does. Recent societal changes
are global in character and require a new moral code—however, such doctrines
should not be elevated to the status of a secular religion. The individualism of
modern rights doctrines does not in itself nullify the possibility of their universal
applicability, but it also does not render them impervious to criticism.
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3 From Common Sense to Obsolescence
While accusations of particularity in human rights doctrines may at least to a cer-
tain extent be rejected in light of the arguments presented in the previous section,
critiques of humanitarian intervention that are connected to relativist arguments
cannot be ignored. One of the underlying assumptions—or claims—that can be
perceived in such criticisms is that a vocabulary of universal rights makes the job
easier for the “hegemon,” as it were, by portraying a favorable image of the inter-
veners, endowing the users of military force with an aura of benevolence, and pro-
viding them with a guise of “universal” credibility. The argument is, therefore, that
doctrines of universal human rights are utilized—either wittingly or unwittingly—
as a tool to legitimize imperialism both past and present.
The most commonly cited examples of dubious military interventions being sup-
ported by the ostensibly humanitarian vernacular of rights may be the invasions
of Grenada and Panama by the United States in 1983 and 1989, respectively, but
even a fleeting glance at history makes it obvious that there has been no monopoly
on justifying the maleficent use of military force through altruistic arguments.60
Even though many post-Cold War interventions have not been subjected to critical
appraisals as intense as those directed against the aforementioned examples, the
theory and practice of humanitarian intervention has nevertheless aroused strong
criticism from this perspective. In the following discussion, an example of such
an intervention critique, with particular emphasis on the discrepancy between the
emancipatory potential of rights and their purported dystopian reality, shall be ex-
amined in detail. However, these approaches are not unproblematic in themselves,
and questions raised by them will serve as background when we return to a wider
assessment of the question of the universality of rights and its connection to the
positive and negative potential of humanitarian intervention.
3.1 A Critical Reproach of a Critical Approach
A passionate case for the contention that the recent practice and development of
human rights and particularly the concept of humanitarian intervention is conser-
vative and imperialist is made by Orford in her monograph Reading Humanitarian
60See e.g. Chesterman 2001, p. 99–106, for discussion. For a positive assessment of the Grenada
intervention, see Tesón 1997, p. 216–219.
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Intervention.61 According to her, the mainstream schools of thought with regard
to humanitarian intervention all disregard the imperial history—and present—
that international law allegedly has. This critical approach which she employs
and which draws from postmodern philosophy and feminist writings portrays the
system of international law as a (neo)colonial enterprise.62 In other words, the
present system is not an impartial or objective system for the adjudication of con-
flicts, working in a world where imperialism and colonialism are a thing of the
past. Instead, international law carries a specific bias that supports neoimperialist
practices while simultaneously conveying an image of itself as a neutral machinery
of arbitration, a just system of law.63
In the opinion of Orford, the use of force by powerful states against mostly third
world nations in support of “civilized” principles such as human rights and hu-
manitarianism is something that shares eerie and unsettling similarities with the
so-called civilizing missions of the colonial era. According to this view, the de-
colonization process that supposedly took place during the Cold War did not in
fact end imperialism at all but instead transformed overt imperialism into a form
of economic subjugation and colonialism where the former colonial states—and
others—are inequal actors without the same freedom of action on the interna-
tional arena as powerful states possess. In Orford’s opinion, humanitarian inter-
vention only serves to bolster that type of imperialism and the unjust international
system instead of counteracting it.64
Using the tools of postmodern philosophy, postcolonial theory and literary analy-
sis, Orford utilizes a “productive misreading” of texts that support humanitarian
intervention with the goal of scrutinizing the unsaid ideologies and principles be-
hind the idea of intervention. She describes the narratives and stories of inter-
vention as actually justifying imperialism in the same way as texts of the 19th
Century—often supported by the women of the time—justified the imperialist
practices of that era. Furthermore, Orford not only claims that pro-interventionist
texts serve the ends of neocolonialism, but she also points out her observation that
such texts can garner support for intervention by helping one to rid oneself of the
feelings of helplessness and powerlessness that atrocities described in the media
and supplanted with graphic imagery of humanitarian suffering may produce in
61Orford 2003.
62See, in particular, Chapter 2 in Orford 2003, “Misreading the texts of international law.”
63Orford 2003, p. 45–54.
64Ibid. The underlying philosophy behind her approach is quite apparent in the following phrase:
“[T]his world of subject-constitution through civilising mission, of Europe and its Others, is the
world of humanitarian intervention.” Orford 2003, p. 64.
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the mind of Westerners. She describes her own experiences with regard to the hu-
manitarian catastrophe of East Timor and her attempts to reconcile her feelings
of helplessness and of the need to “do something” with her fear of supporting im-
perialism through supporting the idea of intervention or the threat of the use of
force in East Timor.65
Moreover, Orford places emphasis on the causes of conflicts and the way in which
texts supporting humanitarian intervention attempt to portray the international
community as having played no part in creating the crises, even though the actual
state of affairs is in her view the exact opposite. In Orford’s analysis, the heroic
“White Knight,” i.e., the intervening nation or the intervening group of nations—
for example NATO in the case of Kosovo—is a masculine subject-character that
either “punishes” or “saves” the feminine “object,” i.e., the target state of interven-
tion, ruled by a stereotypical “rogue dictator.”66 The blame for the event is thus
placed on the target state, and the role that the international community has had
in creating the humanitarian crisis is thus ignored. Examples given by Orford of
the problems that the actions of the international community have created include
the crises in the former Yugoslavia. According to the sources she cites, the policies
of the IMF and the World Bank in the 1980s contributed to the collapse of societal
order in Yugoslavia and thus to the creation of ethnic tensions.67 These problems
are in Orford’s opinion glossed over or completely ignored in most of the literature
on the Kosovo crisis; instead, emphasis is placed on stereotypical and even racist
views of pre-modern ethnic hatred and ruthless dictators.68
In spite of her criticism, Orford holds a supportive stance on human rights doc-
trines as such, which she considers to constitute an emancipatory and revolution-
ary tool, not something that should be used to justify military operations and eco-
nomic neocolonialism.69 The problem she appears to see is one of the international
order and the “mainstream,” abusing the language of human rights and molding
it to suit their militarist narratives and goals, thereby effectively silencing voices
of dissent. In her opinion, the “mainstreaming” of human rights ideology takes
away the subversive and emancipatory potential of the said doctrines.70 This is a
65Orford 2003, p. 14.
66Orford 2003, p. 165–178.
67Orford 2000, p. 87–96.
68Orford 2003, p. 164.
69On the possibilities that human rights make available, see e.g. the conclusion to Orford’s work:
“Human rights may provide one basis for articulating the terms on which [a] new internationalism
might be imagined.” Orford 2003, p. 219.
70See e.g. Orford 2003, p. 202: “This institutionalised commitment to a narrow range of civil and
political rights as the end of military and monetary intervention has shut out other opportunities
for dissenting from the established order or achieving emancipatory ends.”
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concern that is echoed by others, including Allott. According to Allott, the postwar
democratization, institutionalization and legalization of the emerging universal
values reflected in human rights actually “systematically corrupted” them.71 While
there is some value to these views, they raise the question of whether one can
even go about implementing an ideology without “corrupting” it in some way—is
it not true that the “pureness” of an abstract ideology, its very “idealness,” is the
hallmark of the “idea” of ideology?72
On a more general level, it is the opinion of the present writer that Orford’s work
suffers from two serious flaws. First, the view she portrays of the mistakes made by
the international community may be considered exaggerated, even though there
is more than a kernel of truth to the critique she presents. The other flaw—the
more serious one—is that many of Orford’s methodological choices, especially the
use of feminist and literary theory and even allusions to psychoanalysis, serve to
obscure the core of her argument and ultimately undermine the credibility of her
claims regarding the actual problems she identifies.
The arguments presented by Orford in support of her view that humanitarian in-
tervention can be used and indeed has been used to further imperialistic ends
rather than humanitarian ones certainly have value. Even if military intervention
is justified by the need for humanitarian action, it still presents ample opportunity
for exploitation. Furthermore, even if the use of military force or the threat thereof
is actually motivated by true humanitarian needs, which was arguably true in the
case of East Timor and in Kosovo, the end result may still prove less than beneficial
for the people whose lives intervention was intended to improve.
However, the present author considers Orford’s views too extreme, especially when
one reads Orford’s text “between the lines” in the same way she attempts to do
with pro-intervention texts. It appears that Orford is eager to place the blame on
the “established international order,” “the West,” the international capitalist sys-
tem or a similar scapegoat—to employ a slightly inappropriate term—no matter
what the circumstances of a particular case might be. For example, while attempt-
ing to analyze whether her above-mentioned claims of neoliberal monetary poli-
cies supported by the international community in the 1980s being a major factor
71Allott 1999, p. 47. See also the reference to Allott on p. 5 of the present study.
72Cf. p. 35 of this study on the similar views presented by Charlesworth and Chinkin. Orford
does state that “it does not make sense to talk about separating representation from reality, or
intellectual games from real political action,” but the implications of her work nevertheless point
in another direction. Orford 2003, p. 53.
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in the ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia are correct are beyond the scope of
the present work, it is the view of this writer that those claims are quite unrealistic.
Moreover, it may not be appropriate to consider the Kosovo war an example of
Western imperialism when the countries targeted in that intervention were Eu-
ropean, or to talk of “racialised” narratives of humanitarian intervention if the
targets of intervention were geographically located next to Italy and Greece. If
NATO carries out a bombing campaign in Kosovo, to what extent does it make
sense to discuss the “re-establish[ment of] racist cultural boundaries?”73 Sands
notes that while the notion of “unilateral” action is flexible, the contentiousness
of “unilateral” acts is apparent in cases where one community could be seen as
imposing its values on another community.74 From the point of view of the Kosovo
intervention, the question can thus be posed whether NATO was “imposing” mod-
ern European values on the communities of the Balkans. Obviously, the nations of
the Balkans are undeniably quite “European” in any sense of the word. The most
European of all wars, World War I, was triggered by events in the Balkans, and the
area has originally been the European “us” to the Asian or Muslim “them”—or “the
Other” to use the Beauvoirian term—on the opposite side of the Aegean Sea.75 It
is interesting that it was the opposition of China and Russia—two countries that
can be argued to be outside the European system of values, at least today—that
kept NATO from receiving Security Council approval. Thus, it would be illogical to
consider the NATO action a unilateral one where cultural values—in this case, hu-
man rights—are imposed on another community in an “imperial” or “colonialist”
manner.
In more general terms, the present writer would argue that Orford’s mode of think-
ing more or less forces her to view all ethnic violence and all humanitarian crises
as something created by either the international régime of free trade or Western
imperialism in general. Orford writes of her initial confusion regarding the East
Timor crisis and describes the “strange” feeling it invoked.76 In that conflict, vio-
lence was taking place between non-Western peoples and the West initially played
little or no part in the crisis77—and the situation was such that if there was to be
a way to stop that violence, it would in all likelihood have to be through the use
73Orford 2003, p. 190.
74Sands 2000, p. 292–293: “Unilateralism in the international context is intrinsically linked to
sovereignty, territory and jurisdiction.”
75Cf. the cultural-political position of Turkey on p. 9 of the present study.
76See the introduction to Orford 2003, e.g., p. 1–2.
77However, it must be noted that the United States and Britain have been accused of involvement
in training the Indonesian military, which committed atrocities in East Timor. See, for example,
Douzinas 2000, p. 127.
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or the threat of Western military force, which is what did transpire. The thought
of Australian involvement in the Vietnam War decades earlier was so dominant in
Orford’s mind that it had become nigh impossible for her to think of Australian
forces as anything but potential imperialist oppressors—a fact that is distinguish-
able from Orford’s text in a relatively straightforward manner.78
Thus, the problem in Orford’s approach appears to be that the underlying Weltan-
schauung is so inextricably tied to the idea of the West always being the oppressor
and the aggressor; in other words, the confusion Orford experienced may have
stemmed from the fact that real-life events did not match that idealized and stereo-
typed view of the world. In Orford’s previous writings, there is strong criticism of
increasing militarism, particularly with regard to the military influence of the West
around the globe.79 What seems to have been the cause for surprise for Orford and
made the case of East Timor feel “strange” to her was the fact that her method-
ological starting point and theoretical basis wasn’t easy to reconcile with reality
when world events seemed to make it obsolete—or, at the very least, it wasn’t as
all-encompassing as it might have appeared before the East Timor crisis.
It would seem that the credibility of the valid points Orford does make are
negatively affected by her unwillingness to budge from the initial feminist-
deconstructionist viewpoint. Though this may be a vulgar formulation, the as-
sumption in Orford’s commentary seems to be that most, if not all, of the evils
of the world can be traced to Western imperialism and militarism, and events
which fail to match that view are explained and reinterpreted so that the original
assumptions still hold. Instead of the adjustment of their views to the facts, the
tendency of the proponents of such approaches appears to be to adjust the facts to
their views.
An example of Orford’s arguably extreme positions is the surprising juxtaposi-
tion of IMF policies and genocide in East Timor.80 While it is certainly true that
intervention may also have less than desirable effects, Orford implies that the im-
plementation of IMF and World Bank policies is somehow no more desirable than
violence being committed against civilians by Indonesian troops, even though she
does concede that her view was extreme and insinuates that she may no longer
hold that view. Nevertheless, Orford calls both options “symptoms of global cap-
italism,” which in the view of the present writer demonstrates that the approach
78Orford 2003, p. 8–16.
79See e.g. Orford 1999.
80Orford 2003, p. 87–96 and p. 134–140.
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employed places undue emphasis on the reinterpretation of facts so that they are
merely used to reinforce the political and methodological assumptions adopted.81
As stated above, it seems that the more or less extreme positions Orford propounds
only undermine her factual arguments which are valid more often than not. For
example, she quite accurately states that supporting intervention in East Timor,
even for humanitarian purposes, could increase the legitimacy of militarism and
increase the probability of humanitarianism being used to further imperialistic
ends. However, Orford tends to take her approach too far, as the overriding logic
throughout her contribution appears to be that all military action by the West must
be condemned lest we provide support for imperialism and neocolonialism.
The theoretical basis of Orford’s work is another matter that the present writer
finds fault with, especially with regard to the concrete manifestations of the ap-
proach she employs. Orford’s arguments regarding the actions of the international
community and particularly the actions of the West appear circular or even solip-
sist, and these fundamental flaws of her theory are obscured beneath a façade
of feminist theory and literary analysis. For example, Orford criticises interna-
tional law for requiring new members of the international community such as
East Timor to fulfil “what the spirit of international law requires” and for requir-
ing them to mold themselves in accordance with the “idealised self-image of Eu-
ropean sovereign peoples.”82 However, if the present international order is built
on a European idea of sovereign states, that is what East Timor necessarily has to
conform to if it is to be independent within that order. It is a completely valid line
of reasoning to assert that the international community should be different from
what it currently is; however, the type of argument used by Orford appears to be
applicable no matter what the international community is like.
A further drawback of Orford’s feminist-postcolonial approach is that it is used to
state self-evident facts or simple propositions about the world in language that
makes those facts and propositions appear novel: for example, the old notion of
“winners writing history” has been dressed up in the sesquipedalian vernacular of
literary theory: now, “dominant” “narratives” and “stories” allegedly “constitute”
the “self” of the international community to “facilitate empire” and justify colo-
nialism. The facts behind these statements may very well be true and many of
81Orford 2003, p. 29.
82Orford 2003, p. 27–28.
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the points made may indeed be valid, but the methodological tools used do more
harm than they do good for the cause that Orford is attempting to further.83
It is the aforementioned tendency to reinterpret facts to fit the theory instead of
readjusting theory to fit the facts that the present writer considers the most dev-
astating to the credibility of Orford’s valid observations. If human rights discourse
is defined as something revolutionary and a tool of dissent, does it not follow that
it is impossible for any nation—at least for any Western nation—to abide by the
principles of human rights without being accused of distorting them to serve im-
perialistic ends? Such definitions of human rights appear to be designed solely to
keep “powerful states” (namely, Western democracies) on the opposing side of the
argument. Tactics such as these are closely related to the strategy through which
certain commentators seek to explain any potentially benevolent actions that the
West may embark upon as being motivated by selfish ends. If the “established or-
der” is willing to support the cause of human rights, it is interpreted as a plot
to recolonize the Third World through humanitarian intervention; if the West is
critical of its own actions during the colonial period or actively participates in
the creation of human rights treaties, it is seen as a selfish act of cleansing the
conscience of the former colonial powers; et cetera.
Similarly, questioning the objectivity of the international legal order and high-
lighting any bias that may be built into the supposedly impartial system of inter-
national law is a perfectly acceptable point, but what is offered as an alternative?
Is it a system that is truly objective or something that is even more “political?”
This approach calls into question whether one can even write about international
law without being political or subjective. Denying the objectivity of Enlightement-
influenced legal writing of the liberal tradition and attempting to replace it with
something that is even less objective seems to be a defining feature of the critical
“genre,” at least of its more extreme forms.84 If certain approaches are subjective,
it does not mean that all are equal, and Orford fails to provide justification for
why her feminist reading of the texts of international law is superior to “main-
83To employ similar language, a critic of Orford’s might state that there is a “hidden subtext”
of obfuscation in the “story” that Orford wants to tell. Furthermore, utilizing a relatively straight-
forward linguistic perspective with regard to her writings—an approach that is not unlike that
employed by adherents of deconstructionist analysis themselves—shows that passages such as
those describing the “ruthlessness of NATO member states” (Orford 2003, p. 169) may prompt
the question of whether Orford’s method may be accused of being disproportionately political and
subjective.
84With regard to the deconstructionist analysis of law, see e.g. Amaya-Castro—El Menyawi 2005,
where its present status and future prospects are discussed (in fact, literally discussed.)
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stream” views of law. Perhaps such justification exists—however, in the opinion of
the present writer, it is not to be found in Orford’s work.
In general, it must be noted that analyzing the texts of international law—or any
other texts—can help one glean information on the reality that those texts reflect.
However, overemphasis on textual analysis can actually misfocus the discourse
and drive attention away from more urgent issues. For example, what is one to
make of the following statement by Orford:
Intervention texts can thus be read as a response to this threat, an
attempt simultaneously to locate and thus distance the colonised from
the coloniser.85
Such deconstructionist “misreading” of the texts of international law seems quite
unrealistic. To put it simply, the question is whether the above is an accurate de-
scription of how pro-intervention writers “parse” the world—whether they truly
attempt to “locate and thus distance the colonised from the coloniser.” While law
is based on language and text and thus lends itself more readily to textual anal-
ysis than many other fields of study, the route of such approaches is one that we
should tread with caution. The present writer would find it quite surprising if in-
terpretations such as the one quoted above were accurate reflections of the mental
processes of pro-intervention writers instead of reflections of the mental processes
of those who attempt to deconstruct their texts.
As stated, there are more than a few valuable points put forward by Orford, even
though the appropriate criticism is obscured by an unflinching devotion to inap-
propriate methodological tools. To contrast recent events, the Iraq war of 2003
served as an example of the dangers of human rights doctrines being abused by
powerful states in the position of a—or the—hegemon.86 Even though the main
rationale given for the invasion was the alleged threat of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, arguments about human rights and democracy were also used as justification.
This lends some credibility to the argument put forward by Orford: she strongly
implies that there did not necessarily exist a human rights era to begin with, as
85Orford 2003, p. 125.
86Glennon considers the implications of the possibility of a new system with “few hard and fast
rules” coming into existence as a result of the Kosovo intervention. Glennon 1999, p. 2 and p. 4–
6. Even though that arguably did not take place, Glennon’s commentary (with his description
of the Kosovo interveners “effectively abandon[ing] the old U.N.”) viewed against recent events
highlights the possibility that there might not have been that many hard and fast rules to begin
with.
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human rights haven’t been on the agenda of the United Nations for a long time, if
they ever were.87 Even though this writer would not necessarily subscribe to such
a point of view, it appears that arguments of the ever-increasing influence of hu-
man rights doctrines has been somewhat exaggerated—taking into consideration
the political realities of the world arena and particularly the increasing influence
and power of the People’s Republic of China. In light of these facts and of a critical
yet open-minded assessment of Orford’s contribution, it may very well be that the
language of rights is being used increasingly often, but the practice of human rights
is something that may actually be regressing.
Concluding observation. A closer examination of a feminist-deconstructionist cri-
tique of humanitarian intervention and human rights discourse uncovers the flaws
apparent in many such approaches: the philosophical, methodological and ideo-
logical underpinnings often gain the upper hand in the critique so that they ob-
scure the valuable points made and may even render the contributions counterpro-
ductive. Nonetheless, Orford’s analysis successfully highlights certain problematic
aspects of humanitarian intervention which should not be ignored; in particular,
the possible connection between the language of human rights and the perpetua-
tion of that which Orford calls hegemony should not escape one’s attention.
3.2 Universality: Purity of Essence or Peace on Earth?
Even though the methodological background of some analyses of the problems
associated with humanitarian intervention can be subjected to a skeptical exami-
nation, the criticisms presented in them highlight the past failures and the future
implications of the use of force that is in violation of the Charter but is carried out
in the name of a humanitarian “just cause.” Events such as the aforementioned Iraq
war may once again call into question the future prospects of the present system of
international law. It would be far-fetched to predict an end to the current Charter
system or even a major change to how the United Nations functions,88 but it seems
that the exuberant hopes of the early 1990s of the U.N. gaining a stronger role in
international affairs and a more just “New World Order” emerging in the wake of
87Orford 2003, p. 187–203 and p. 201–202 in particular.
88The difficulties involved with the efforts to reform the U.N. are well known (see p. 69 of the
present study). The fact that major changes to the Charter system are not in sight may have to do
with the fact that the post-WWII situation in 1945 was indeed a historical “window of opportunity”
to reform the system of international affairs—one which had not been seen in the past and may
not be seen in the near future, if ever. Cf. p. 13 of the present study.
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the Decade of International Law do not seem realistic any more.89 Even though
human rights are being debated on the international arena with increasing inten-
sity, it does not appear that the humanitarian situation is improving—particularly
with the actions of certain parties that have showed a willingness to leverage their
positions as global or regional hegemons through the United Nations system rather
than to cooperate for a more “just” world (assuming that the definition of “just”
does not encompass notions where hegemony is a necessary feature of justness.)
As Falk points out, the relevance or obsolescence of international law is a now a
matter of controversy.90 In Falk’s opinion, the case of the war in Iraq highlighted
the problems inherent in just war doctrines. In light of the views presented above,
it does appear quite obvious that those doctrines do not necessarily lead to a more
just world. The shift from justifying the Iraq intervention by the need to prevent
the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction to doing so by way of
arguments of “liberation” is something that in Falk’s opinion makes the limits of
the just war approach evident. Still, Falk emphasizes the need to retain a way of
dealing with humanitarian crises so that there remains a high treshold for the use
of force—possibly by reforming the United Nations. In other words, he wants to
keep open the option of waging war for humanitarian purposes as a last resort. This
conclusion is quite unsurprising when one considers the political realities of the
world today, but implementing any reforms will undoubtedly prove difficult.91 Falk
recognizes this and states that the utopianism of such endeavors is still preferable
to the dystopian world that a blank slate to use force would entail.92
However, the dystopian world that we arguably live in already, a world where
humanitarian crises cannot be adequately addressed, seems to be the most likely
one for the near future. The recent crisis in Darfur has, as discussed by Straus,
demonstrated the unwillingness or at least the ineffectiveness or inability of the
international community to stop humanitarian catastrophes that are caused by
state-sponsored policies of persecution, even if there are strong (although far from
unanimous) calls to term such policies genocide—something that has been quite
89Discussion of a “New World Order” with more emphasis on the rule of law instead of a “law
of the jungle” was limited to the late 1980s and early 1990s. See e.g. Bedjaoui 1994, where the
possibility of a more stringent legal control of the Security Council is considered in light of those
developments—concerns that no longer appear to be particularly relevant.
90Falk 2004.
91Analyzing the benefits and drawbacks of “the new U.N.” is destined to remain in the realm of
the theoretical: for the foreseeable future, making even minor adjustments to the current system
seems woefully difficult, and instituting any larger reforms is bound to be essentially impossible.
92Falk 2004, p. 45.
32
exceptional in the past.93 In the end, the effect that calling an ongoing catastro-
phe “genocide” has does appear relatively insignificant. Douzinas is among those
who consider genocide to be the “greatest threat to peace” there is,94 but it seems
that such formulations are ultimately destined to have the same status as oppos-
ing views: that of a rhetorical device or strategy of argumentation. Regardless of
whether the Darfur crisis can be considered genocide—in the opinion of Straus, it
boils down to the definition of genocide95—and regardless of whether genocide is
considered the greatest threat to peace imaginable, the fact that the events taking
place in Darfur constitute a large-scale man-made humanitarian catastrophe and
the fact that the international community has failed to take adequate measures
to put an end to them leads the present writer to conclude that genocide which
does not transcend boundaries and takes place outside the immediate sphere of
Western influence is not widely considered a “threat to the peace.”
If genocide as such did present the greatest threat to peace imaginable, the re-
sponse from the international community to the Darfur crisis would surely have
been one of different proportions. Above, it was argued that the ban on genocide
is one of the truly universally accepted (international) moral and ethical norms.
If flagrant violations of such a universal norm—or atrocities that at least approach
that definition—do not spark widespread condemnation around the world, there
seems to be little choice except to yield to the dystopian conclusion that morals
and ethics play little or no part in international affairs today.
Here it may be interesting to consider some feminist critiques with regard
to humanitarian intervention, mentioned in the discussion on Orford above.
Charlesworth and Chinkin contend that women’s experiences and concerns have
not been taken into account in international discourse, leading to an inadequate
and narrow system of public international law.96 In particular, human rights doc-
trines do not adequately reflect the needs of women. According to Charlesworth
and Chinkin, the problems that plague rights discourse include: that the language
of rights is individualistic and unable to echo the concerns of women; that human
rights doctrines oversimplify complex power relations in (international) society;
93Straus 2005, p. 131–133: “The genocide debate and the Darfur crisis [. . . ] have made it clear
that “genocide” is not a magic word that triggers intervention.”
94Douzinas 2000, p. 139–140.
95Straus 2005, p. 132: “[T]he violence in Darfur does appear to be genocide” if one uses stan-
dards under which the Srebrenica massacre can be considered genocide; however, Straus points
out that “[f]or many observers, however, genocide is something else: a campaign designed to phys-
ically eliminate a group under a goverment’s control” and that “both [definitions] are defensible.”
96Charlesworth—Chinkin 2000.
33
and that some rights can in fact be used to serve as justification for the oppression
of women.97
As with the views put forward by Orford, the critique presented by Charlesworth
and Chinkin raises numerous valid points. However, such concerns are not limited
to gender issues and the rights of women. In particular, the problems of the uni-
versality of rights and the abuse of human rights arguments for malevolent ends
have been discussed previously. The nature of rights as a two-edged sword that
can be used and abused to serve nefarious purposes is more or less pathological
to rights discourse, as has been seen.98 Similarly, the individualistic character of
human rights language is to some degree unavoidable and something that is not
necessarily an entirely negative aspect, due to the fact that (nearly) universal pro-
hibitions such as the prohibition of racism can be argued to be based on individu-
alistic principles, as argued earlier. Criticism of rights from a feminist perspective,
exemplified particularly well in the writings of Orford, Charlesworth and Chinkin
among others, can ultimately be traced to the aforementioned general criticisms
and counter-criticisms.
However, there are certain aspects of feminist critique that warrant further com-
mentary in addition to what was stated above in the discussion on Orford’s writ-
ings. Charlesworth and Chinkin draw interesting juxtapositions between feminist
critiques and cultural / relativist critiques of human rights law.99 According to
their view, those two strands of critique are parallel in nature. The different posi-
tions women have in different cultures, the fact that human rights law is based on
the Western assumption of a free and independent woman and the fact that the
idea of individual rights has “little resonance” in many cultures leads to practical
problems. According to them, the idea of human rights may not necessarily be
useful from this perspective and may even be detrimental from the point of view
of empowering women and enhancing the quality of their life.
There are other parallels that the present author discerns between the approaches
of Orford on the one hand and Charlesworth & Chinkin on the other. Charlesworth
and Chinkin contend that one of the general problems of human rights doctrines
from the point of view of women is the alleged fact that a specialized “women’s”
branch of human rights law has resulted in its marginalization.100 One can actually
97Charlesworth—Chinkin 2000; see in particular “Inadequacies of human rights law for women,”
p. 218 onwards.
98See p. 14 of the present study; however, as was discussed above, human rights language may
not be as vulnerable to “abuse” as, for example, arguments of cultural relativism can.
99Charlesworth—Chinkin 2000, p. 223, and p. 221–222.
100Charlesworth—Chinkin 2000, p. 218.
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interpret this criticism of “mainstreaming” as criticism of the failure of the imple-
mentation of these ideologies, or, to take the point a bit further, of the failure of
these feminist ideologies to garner support in the form that their adherents would
like to see. In other words, the blame should not necessarily be placed on the
“mainstreaming” of those human rights doctrines; instead, the alleged marginal-
ization of (women’s) human rights law could be seen as a result of the flawed
premises of feminist ideologies or at least the failed manifestations or implemen-
tations of that ideology—at the very least, these are possibilities that seem to have
been overlooked. For example, Charlesworth and Chinkin101 as well as Orford102
contend that women are not taken into account in the views that have been pre-
sented in favor of humanitarian intervention. It can hardly be contested that mil-
itary intervention for humanitarian purposes has in many cases resulted in more
humanitarian suffering and that women are often the hardest hit in such situa-
tions. However, it is difficult to see to what extent such developments can actu-
ally be blamed on the “mainstreaming” of human rights law, the increasing use
of human rights discourse in international affairs and the creation of specialized
branches of human rights law such as women’s rights.
Again, the underlying question is whether human rights language has only served
to exacerbate human suffering or whether it has in fact helped prevent situations
that would be even more regrettable from a humanitarian point of view. What-
ever the answer—if an “objective” answer even exists—it is the opinion of this
writer that while problems exist with the current doctrines of human rights and
humanitarian intervention and with their practical implementations, those prob-
lems do not stem from the fact that they have become “mainstream” as such.
Mainstreaming is what “only” makes the inherent problems with those doctrines—
or any doctrines—overt. This applies equally to mainstream human rights law as
well as feminist conceptions of how women’s interests should be protected. As
long as those doctrines are not implemented in reality, they remain in the perfect
and utopian Platonic world of ideas—as idealized by their proponents and adher-
ents. When those doctrines or parts of them gain support and are employed in
practice, they necessarily lose at least some of their idealized perfect nature, and
it may be that it is that fact that their supporters are ultimately unhappy with, not
101Charlesworth—Chinkin 2000, p. 268.
102Orford 2003. See also e.g. Orford 1999, p. 709: “The hero possesses the attributes of that
version of aggressive white masculinity produced in late twentieth-century US culture, a white
masculinity obsessed with competitive militarism and the protection of universal (read imperial)
values.”
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“mainstreaming” per se.103 A suitable comparison would be to draw parallels with
the response of some Marxist writers to the fall of the Soviet Union: the claim is
that Communism did not fail, since “real Communism” had not been implemented
and that previous attempts had only been “state capitalist” style perversions of the
true Marxist ideal of Communism.104 However, from a pragmatic point of view, it
seems that an ideology is only as good as its implementations.105
To extend the parallel further, the same position could be taken with regard to
other criticisms that have been leveled against humanitarian intervention from a
practical point of view. For example, the fact that interventions are usually carried
out when the action will be relatively inexpensive in terms of economic impact
and potential casualties on the side of the interveners—and when the target state
is a weak nation in terms of military and economic power—is an obvious prac-
tical problem identified by Chinkin, though the issue may be argued to have a
moral-philosophical side to it as well.106 A similar position is presented by Walzer
who emphasizes that when the suitability of intervention is considered, taking into
account all factors is morally necessary—so that “just purposes” and “just conse-
quences” are not necessarily in conflict.107 Furthermore, with particular reference
to the Kosovo intervention, Douzinas criticizes the fact that NATO casualties were
avoided more actively than Kosovar and Serbian casualties, for example in the de-
cisions to prefer aerial bombardment to the use of ground troops.108 While these
are concerns of utmost validity, the question that remains is whether these prob-
lems are the inevitable fault of ideologies of (militarized) humanitarianism or only
issues with their implementation—i.e., whether such ideologies are impossible to
execute in practice without encountering similar problems. If humanitarian ide-
ologies are considered to be twisted and perverted by the act of carrying them out
in practice, it may be difficult to avoid the interpretation that such an approach
turns the abstract idea of human rights into an object of idolatry as a perfect and
idealized secular religion—an approach that entails dire practical and philosophi-
cal ramifications, as was discussed above.
103Interestingly, it would at least initially appear that if a doctrine cannot be considered main-
stream, one cannot make a claim as to it being concomitantly universal; however, this perspective
is not particularly relevant to the present study.
104For examples of this approach, see e.g. the decidedly hyperlexic contribution of Chimni 1993,
who extols the virtues of the Soviet system, noting the “momentous achievements” of the Soviet
Union, p. 168–169, while maintaining that “the hostility of the capitalist world had helped establish
and sustain the Stalinist model which seriously distorted the idea of socialism.”
105See above, p. 25 of the present study.
106Chinkin 2000, p. 37.
107Walzer 2004.
108Douzinas 2000, p. 133–136: “A strict hierarchisation of the value of life was again evident
during the conflict.”
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At this point it may be appropriate to return to the question of universality for
one more time. According to Ignatieff, the universality of rights is based on them
defining “the universal interests of the powerless.”109 In other words, it is the em-
powering nature of rights that makes them universal, not their purported ability to
define in a universal, culture-neutral way what is acceptable behaviour and what
is not—let alone any empirical notions of universality that might be attached to
rights. However, it is interesting to compare this view with the arguments put
forward by Orford, Chinkin, Charlesworth et al, according to which rights lan-
guage can actually serve to marginalize the powerless even further. Thus, from
this perspective it would appear that the universality of human rights could be an
empirical question after all, but not in the sense of whether the mainstream of hu-
man rights represents a set of values that can be considered universally accepted
or acceptable, but instead in the sense of whether human rights have actually suc-
ceeded or whether they have the potential to succeed as a tool of giving a voice
to the powerless—i.e., whether and to what extent human rights are effectively
implementable as an empowering instrument.
Still, from this perspective, one should make particular note of the criticism put
forward by Douzinas and reflected in many of the arguments examined above:
even though the 20th Century was a “human rights century,” it still saw more vio-
lent deaths than any other period in history.110 Of course, there is also the question
of cause and effect,111 but to the present writer, the central dilemma seems to be
as follows: if human rights doctrines have been unable to stop widespread carnage
even if that is what many powerful nations have arguably yearned to achieve, how
could they succeed in giving a voice to the powerless? However, considering the
history and purpose of the Charter,112 it seems to be only relatively recently that
the ideas originally put forward in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
have become a tool of empowerment and an instrument of “revolutionary poten-
tial” as Orford describes them.113 When one considers this possibility, the claims
109Ignatieff 2001, p. 73. Similarly, Leino-Sandberg 2005, p. 47, asks, “Could it not be thought
that the function of human rights is mainly in empowering individuals against their own govern-
ments?” She also contends that “[t]his universality seems more compatible with the wishes of the
non-Western world.” However, this assumes that non-Western cultures share our appreciation of
subversiveness, which may not be true. See also p. 8 of the present study on the empowering factor
inherent in the newly-found independence gained by nations in the colonial revolution.
110Douzinas 2002, p. 437: “The 20th Century was the century of massacre, genocide, ethnic
cleansing – the age of the Holocaust [. . . ] no degree of progress allows one to ignore the fact
that never before, in absolute figures, have so many men, women and children been subjugated,
starved or exterminated.”
111The question is to what extent the human rights revolution was an inevitable result of some of
the atrocities of the 20th Century—see e.g. p. 9 above.
112Cf. the discussion on p. 5 and p. 48 of the present study.
113See above, p. 24.
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that human rights have been robbed of their emancipatory power seem unjusti-
fied. Furthermore, as Ignatieff notes, “the very purpose of rights language is to
protect and enhance individual agency,”114 raising the question of whether the
possibility of human rights fulfilling that promise is greater than the danger of
them ultimately serving “imperialistic” agendas. In fact, the increasing use of hu-
man rights language in debates on the international arena seems to suggest that a
development of the opposite kind is in fact taking place: even if the apparent lack
of improvement in the human condition may seem disheartening, it may be that
human rights language has at least provided a vocabulary for a universal want:
voicing concerns.
Concluding observation. The difficulty in instituting reforms in the current interna-
tional system limits the gamut of implementable options: ongoing atrocities and
crises will not necessarily prompt action from the international community insofar
as measures other than mere condemnation are concerned—a fact that the Darfur
catastrophe bears witness to. Still, international law may not be heading towards
obsolescence as rapidly as some may fear. Certain criticisms of the “mainstream-
ing” of human rights and humanitarian intervention, flawed though they may be,
manage to demonstrate the inescapable fact that implementation-level dilemmas
of humanitarian doctrines—both on a legal level and in practice—are in the end
greater than the philosophical problems involved. A reappraisal of the concept of
universality can recast rights doctrines as a more emancipatory humanitarian tool,
alleviating the misgivings that have been articulated with regard to the language
of rights being distorted to further hegemonic agendas. These are lessons to be
heeded when searching for “the least bad solution” to the problem of approach-
ing humanitarian intervention; i.e., a solution which ensures that humanitarian
concerns are not left unattended and the danger of the malevolent use of military
action is kept to a minimum.
114Ignatieff 2001, p. 18.
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4 The Relevant Law
The crux of the legal problem of humanitarian intervention can be concisely char-
acterized as a conflict between the prohibition of the use of force in interna-
tional relations and the arguably more recent—and undeniably more ambiguous—
doctrines of the primacy of human rights in international law.115 The general pro-
hibition on the use of force is one of the most central norms in international law
today. As a general principle, it is practically universally accepted and uncontested.
In this section, we will examine the international legal framework with regard to
that norm, something that is particularly relevant if one wishes to formulate a
position on the main problem that is both comprehensive and compelling.
4.1 The Prohibition of the Use of Force
Unlike in the past,116 today it can be said to be an unchallenged fact that a pro-
hibition of the use of (military) force against another nation or of the threat to
use force exists in the present system of international law. It is one of the most
fundamental rules of modern international law or even the most fundamental cor-
nerstone of that system.117 However, even though the existence of the norm in
question is not in dispute per se, there are few areas of international law that have
aroused as much controversy as the prohibition of the threat or use of force.118
The underlying reason for these disputes can be conjectured to be that the most
fundamental problems of power, wealth and territory are inherently manifested
within the field of the use of force. The use of force is a close kin of the use of
115See e.g. Harhoff 2001, p. 66, on Kosovo: “[The] controversy transpired as the conflict between
the ban on the use or threat of force on the one hand, and the assumed duty to prevent violations
of human rights and humanitarian law by all means – even by armed force if necessary – on the
other.” However, compare Gowlland-Debbas 2000, p. 379: “The debate has been wrongly stated as
a choice between protection of human rights on the one hand and state sovereignty on the other –
it is really a debate over the means not the ends, for remedial action can encompass a number of
reactions to human rights violations.” See also Chesterman 2001, p. 45.
116On the development of the prohibition of the use of force, see Brownlie 1963, in particular
p. 235–237 on the Kellogg—Briand Pact of 1928 (Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as
an Instrument of National Policy), which was an attempt at codifying such a prohibition. Although
its immediate effect was arguably negligible, it was, according to Brownlie 2003, p. 698–699,
“important as a background to the creation of customary law pre-Charter.”
117Charter of the United Nations, Art. 2(4); see below. See also the Judgment in Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (United States v. Nicaragua). ICJ Reports (1986), p.
94, para 176.
118Gray 2000, p. 3, describes it as “one of the most controversial areas of international law.”
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power, and if international affairs can be called a system of “power play,”119 it is
inevitable that the use of force will play a central part in it. Because of the undis-
puted nature of the prohibition itself, it is the definitions related to the prohibition
and the exceptions to it that have been at the center of controversy.120
The prohibition of the use of force has been codified in Article 2(4) of the United
Nations Charter.121 The background to this codification can be found in the cata-
clysm of the Second World War after which the prevailing major powers wished
to prevent the policies that had led to the war from ever being accepted again.
The failure of the League of Nations also served as the background to this, and
the United Nations was intended to avoid the same failure. However, the Charter
system that was put in place was designed in a way that guaranteed the interests
of the major powers and served to legitimize their actions before and after the
war.122 It can nevertheless be argued that the manner in which the dominant posi-
tion of the post-WWII superpowers was etched in the Charter system, particularly
in the Security Council, was more or less unavoidable because the system had to
have the backing of the major powers to maintain its credibility and to avoid the
decline into irrelevancy that had befallen the League of Nations.
The fact that the prohibition on the threat or the use of force is a common source
of controversy in international affairs raises the question of how effective inter-
national law truly is. Depending on the point of view one espouses, cases where
the prohibition of the use of force is at the core of a dispute can be seen as an
example of international law being ineffective in the sense that one of the most
fundamental norms of the system cannot be adequately enforced or upheld. Gray,
for example, notes that there exists “widespread scepticism as to the “effective-
ness” of international law on the use of force.”123 As a counterpoint, she mentions
the position taken by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case (1986): a rule need not be
universally complied with for it to be an existing customary rule of international
law. The ICJ, furthermore, made the argument that if breaches to a rule are also
treated by states as illegal breaches, they may actually serve to strengthen the rule
instead of weakening it.124 If this position was to be applied to the question of
119See e.g. Brenfors—Petersen 2000, p. 450–451, where the power-play aspect is employed as an
argument in the Kosovo case. See also p. 60 of the present study.
120Cf. Gray 2000, p. 3.
121The text of Art. 2(4) is as follows: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”
122Douzinas 2000, p. 118. See also the previous discussion in the present study.
123Gray 2000, p. 19.
124See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, United States v. Nicaragua,
ICJ Reports (1986).
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the prohibition on the use of force being violated, the ‘effectiveness’ of the current
Charter-based system of security would not necessarily be in question as long as
the illegal nature of the violations was consistently upheld.125
However, Gray does state that this position cannot be taken too far,126 and it is
quite easy to agree with her: it is difficult to see, for example, how a hypothetical
rule that enjoys no practical support among nations and is universally breached
could be considered a customary rule of international law. Of course, the prohi-
bition on the use of force is far from being universally breached, but a simplistic
manner of defining the problem would be to state that a line has to be drawn
somewhere.127 Nonetheless, what should be noted here is that if the current pro-
hibition is to be maintained, it may be prudent to abstain from taking too lenient
a stance on breaches to it.
In Gray’s opinion, the current rule(s) on the use of force also have a declaratory
character.128 Thus, not only are they a reflection of state practice but also “a goal
to be aimed at,” and Gray considers this aspect of the norms in question to be
reflected in certain resolutions of the General Assembly and in international doc-
uments and declarations, even though their significance is somewhat hampered
by the reluctance of Western nations to give them credence.129 These points il-
lustrate that even though the prohibition on the use of force is one of the most
basic norms of international law, its justification is ultimately based on its accep-
tance by states—which is difficult to define, the Charter and the Vienna Conven-
tion notwithstanding—and the significance of which is based on state practice,
the importance of which is in turn based on itself. Any argument that attempts to
delve into the very foundations of the prohibition on the use of force seems to be
destined to become a circular one.130 Furthermore, from the point of view of the
efficiency and relevance of international law, it is worth noting that Gray points
out that there are “rare instances” that “stand out” where states decline to even
125See also Meron 2000, p. 275–278, under “Limitations to the Effectiveness of Laws.”
126Gray 2000, p. 20: “[T]he insistence that breaches may be seen as strengthening rather than
negating rules cannot be taken too far without losing plausibility.”
127See, for example, Koskenniemi 1989, wherein it is argued that the process of legal argumenta-
tion cannot necessarily be used to arrive at objective or rational resolutions; instead, they provide
the rules or grammar that can be employed to provide justification for a given answer between two
extremes.
128Gray 2000, p. 21.
129Ibid. “[The] symbolic function [of the rules] is apparent in the African Charter and the 1984
General Assembly Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace [. . . ] the Western states have been
suspicious of such resolutions and their ritual reaffirmation of existing rules.” Gray 2000, p. 21–22.
130The practical danger with the failure of international law to provide answers to questions of
such a fundamental nature may be that in the eyes of some, the system may lose its validity and
credibility when its character as an “argument-supporting” structure becomes apparent.
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try to offer a legal explanation for their assumed violations of the rules on the use
of force.131 Such cases highlight a noteworthy aspect of the debate on the use of
force and humanitarian intervention: put quite simply, a strictly legal perspective
may not necessarily be the preferable approach.
Concluding observation. In the present framework of international law, few rules
are as universally agreed upon as the ban on the use of force in international rela-
tions and few are as commonly at the center of major disputes on the international
arena. Resolving such conflicts in a satisfactory manner may be difficult, unless one
is willing to explore the fundamental assumptions underlying the rules—or, from
a more pragmatic point of view, it may prove beneficial to approach such “hard
cases” in a manner that takes into account the practical-political considerations
involved.
4.2 Acceptable Exceptions
As was already noted, the prohibition on the use of force is not a source of contro-
versy in itself; rather, the problem lies in the problem of interpreting the exceptions
to the rule. In particular, the most important exception not only has a jus cogens
character but is also more or less clearly set out in the United Nations Charter.
Even though there is little disagreement on the basic content of the main excep-
tions and even though their codification in the Charter aids one in discovering
their fundamental content, it is how they should be interpreted that seems to be
at the core of the legal issues in most conflicts where questions on the use of force
are relevant.
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter is the main source where the right to self-defense is
explicitly defined. Furthermore, that codification is carried out by referring to the
“inherent right” (emphasis added) of nations to defend themselves against armed
attacks.132 The natural right to self-defense is an uncontested fact of customary
international law, and the practical-political ratio behind it appears self-evident:
one would be hard-pressed to imagine a nation that would deny itself the right to
131Gray 2000, p. 22.
132Art. 51 of the Charter: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and secu-
rity. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility
of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
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engage in self-defense when it is attacked. Gray states that it is the interpretation
and the extent of Art. 51 that are usually in dispute when questions of self-defense
are assessed.133 In themselves, the right to self-defense and the main content of
Art. 51 are so widely agreed upon as justifications for the use of force that states
will often attempt to justify their use of force by referring to Art. 51 even when
such an argument would appear far-fetched.134
Historically, statements by the Security Council on Art. 51 have been few and far
between, the main reason being the Cold War-era deadlock in the Council. Due
to the lack of consensus between the rival superpowers, there were few situations
where the Security Council passed resolutions that would have had significance re-
garding the right to self-defense—at least from the point of view of humanitarian
intervention. Instead of being labeled “humanitarian interventions” by their insti-
gators, military actions of the Cold War were predominantly justified by reference
to the right to self-defense. For example, the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda in
1979 and the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia were justified through argu-
ments of self-defense instead of arguments of humanitarian intervention.135 Fur-
thermore, as Gray points out, arguments based on a “doctrine” of humanitarian
intervention were for the most part advanced by writers instead of states.136 It
would appear that Art. 51 was preferred as justification due to its jus cogens na-
ture and the controversial nature of “separate” doctrines of humanitarian inter-
vention: even though justifying the use of force through arguments of self-defense
can often be controversial,137 such arguments are still far less controversial than
arguments of a right to “humanitarian intervention,” as states can be assumed to
rely on those arguments that are the most likely to be considered acceptable by
the international community.138 Nevertheless, the prevailing opinion on Art. 51
and humanitarian intervention appears to be in line with Simma’s statement that
133Gray 2000, p. 86.
134Gray 2000, p. 87. See also the summary of cases in Aro—Petman 1999, p. 12–13.
135See Chesterman 2001, p. 77—81. For example, on the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia,
Chesterman (p. 81) notes: “When one looks for opinio juris there is an immediate problem that
neither the acting state nor any of the (few) states that supported the action articulated anything
resembling a right of humanitarian intervention.” See also Gray 2000, p. 26.
136Gray 2000, p. 27. See later, p. 47 of the present study.
137For example, this applies to the interventions in Uganda and Cambodia mentioned above.
138Of course, such an assumption contains the presupposition that states prefer to employ those
arguments that are likely to be accepted by the international community even if there exist other
(moral or legal) arguments that would be more in line with the actual motives of the state—
something that would lend support to the view of international law being more of a “language
game” than a legal system capable of providing objective answers. Cf. e.g. Koskenniemi 2004,
p. 198: international law is described as a “process of articulating political preferences into legal
claims that cannot be detached from the conditions of political contestation in which they are
made.”
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Article 51 is simply not available when a humanitarian crisis is confined to a single
state.139
The other major exception to the prohibition on the use of force is something that
is not a peremptory norm of international law but a system which was established
with the United Nations Charter. Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security
Council has the power to authorize the use of force in response to a breach of
the peace or to a threat thereof.140 This possibility that was given to the Security
Council in the Charter remained more or less unused due to the Cold War-era
disagreement between the major powers in the Council.141 It was only in the early
1990s, in the build-up to the Gulf War, that the Council finally made use of its
powers to authorize the use of force. Such authorizations, however, unavoidably
bring with them new problems of interpretation and application.
As discussed by Chesterman, the wording of Article 39 in Chapter VII suggests that
the Council should first determine that a threat to or a breach of the peace or an
act of aggression exists and then decide on the measures to be taken—i.e., pass
judgment on whether the use of force by member states should be authorized. It is
the prerogative of the Security Council to decide whether a conflict has escalated
or is about to escalate to a point where the use of force is justified.142 It goes
without saying that it is this inherently political decision-making process by the
Council that is often at the center of controversy. Even though consensus on the
applicability of Chapter VII powers among the permanent members in the Council
has proven elusive more often than not, a clear shift in the overall position of
Security Council resolutions since the end of the Cold War—but before the Kosovo
intervention—was undeniable. Not only did the Security Council impose sanctions
on several occasions and authorize a large number of peacekeeping operations
during the 1990s, but it also authorized the use of force under Chapter VII several
times.143
139Simma 1999, p. 5.
140The text of Article 39 is as follows: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations,
or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or
restore international peace and security.” — Furthermore, Article 42 states: “Should the Security
Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to
be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and
other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.”
141Chesterman 2001, p. 114–7.
142Chesterman 2001, p. 124–5.
143Chesterman 2001, p. 121–124.
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What is particularly notable is the willingness to intervene in internal armed
conflicts, demonstrated particularly well in the resolutions regarding the pro-
tection of the Kurds in Iraq and the crisis in Somalia in 1992.144 According to
Chesterman, the actions of the Council in the early 1990s demonstrated a “grad-
ual shift away from the transboundary implications of a situation.”145 There was
an increasing willingness to interpret internal humanitarian crises as threats to
international peace and security—the domestic jurisdiction article (Art. 2(7))
notwithstanding—and as requiring measures ranging from economic blockades
to military intervention. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the Security Council’s
ambiguously worded Resolution 688 on the Kurds—and its wide-ranging interpre-
tation, used to justify the use of force against Iraq in the 1990s—had a particularly
profound effect on the significance of Chapter VII. However, the controversy of the
Kosovo case in 1999, discussed below, more or less put an end to the trend of the
increasing use of Chapter VII powers.
One should also note that Chapter VIII of the Charter provides the possibility of
employing regional and multilateral security arrangements.146 However, this option
never gained an essential role during the Cold War and its applicability today,
particularly with regard to questions of humanitarian intervention, is relatively
minor147 and thus quite peripheral to the problem. For example, NATO is not con-
sidered a regional organization in the sense of Chapter VIII as it has refused to
take on this role; besides, the general consensus is that it would be inapplicable
to NATO in the first place.148 Moreover, any arrangements under Chapter VIII are
subsidiary to the main rules on the use of force, to the self-defense clause in Ar-
ticle 51 and to the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council
in approving the use of military force.149 Multilateral Chapter VIII arrangements
cannot be seen as widening the acceptable range of the use of force. Thus, even
though multilateral organizations theoretically could—and should—bear the re-
sponsibility in the settlement of disputes and in maintaining (regional) peace and
stability, their importance from the perspective of the acceptability of humanitar-
ian intervention is minuscule.
144Iraq: S/RES/688 (1991). Somalia: S/RES/794 (1992). For a pro-interventionist discussion of
S/RES/794, see Tesón 1997, p. 246–249.
145Chesterman 2001, p. 151.
146Charter of the United Nations, Ch. VIII, Arts. 52—54.
147Cf. Aro—Petman 1999, p. 70.
148See Simma 1999, p. 10; see also Simma 1999, p. 14–21, for a discussion on the position of
NATO.
149Art. 53 of the Charter contains a provision according to which “[. . . ] no enforcement action
shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of
the Security Council [. . . ]”
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Concluding observation. The self-defense clause of Art. 51 and the security system
instituted in Ch. VII constitute the primary justifications for the use of force in
the Charter system—and it is mainly the latter which is relevant from the point of
view of humanitarian intervention. The 1990s saw the rapid expansion of the uti-
lization of Ch. VII powers by the Security Council in state-internal (humanitarian)
conflicts, a development that experienced an abrupt end with the Kosovo crisis.
4.3 The Gray Area
When one examines the problem of the acceptability of humanitarian interven-
tion, the most important distinction to be made is the one between interventions
that have a legal basis within the Charter system—mainly through the above-
mentioned system of Security Council authorization under Chapter VII—and in-
terventions where questions of legitimacy as opposed to legality are raised because
adequate legal justification that has sufficient support within the international sys-
tem cannot be found or because the legal justifications are in dispute in another
way even though there is wide political support for forceful measures.150 Here,
we are concerned with the latter type of interventions, “unauthorized” humanitar-
ian interventions, i.e., the problems that fall within the gray area of “justifiability”
where extra-legal, ethical or moral arguments typically based on the vernacular of
human rights may, according to some commentators, override the general ban on
the use of force.
It seems to be the prevailing consensus in the international community that there
exists no right to humanitarian intervention that would have its genesis in extra-
legal arguments such as moral considerations that do not fulfil the requirements
for “legal” use of force.151 In other words, these doctrines have not entered the
150Harhoff 2001, p. 72, suggests the following legal definition for humanitarian intervention:
“The use of armed force by one or more States against another State in which an internal conflict
is taking place, with the humanitarian objective to prevent the commission of (1) genocide, (2)
serious violations of the international humanitarian law applicable to internal armed conflicts,
(3) widespread or systematic attacks against a civilian population, or (4) serious violations of
recognized and fundamental international human rights standards, when these atrocities cannot
be averted by peaceful means, and when the use of foreign armed force is neither discharged
as a legitimate act of self-defence, nor carried out upon invitation of the conflict State.” Even
though definitions such as this may be unavoidable in a discussion of humanitarian intervention,
see section 5.2 of this study on the problematic issues associated with the drafting of definitions
and criteria.
151For example, Rytter concludes that “under established customary international law there is no
right of humanitarian intervention without the authorisation of the Security [Council],” at least
not until 1999. Rytter 2001, p. 144. See the following chapter for a more detailed discussion of
attempts at justifying interventions by legal or extra-legal arguments.
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system of international law as rules of customary law at present time. As was al-
ready noted, arguments in favor of such doctrines have mainly been presented by
writers, not states; notably, the writers that have voiced support for such a doc-
trine of humanitarian intervention have been predominantly American.152 From a
political-pragmatic viewpoint, this fact does—due to American hegemony on the
international arena and the aspirations towards maintaining such a position153—
raise questions about possible connections to specific foreign policy goals that may
not be the same as the humanitarian considerations presented as justification. On
the other hand, it is the view of this writer that even in a field of study such as
international law, arguments should be considered in themselves and judged on
their relative merits; thus, the emphasis should be less on the possible motivations
behind an argument or on who has presented a specific argument, and more on the
argument itself. Nevertheless, such considerations cannot be entirely overlooked
in any inquiry that strives to be impartial, either.154
One of the more obvious properties of the current system of international law
and international affairs is the way in which many parts of it have formed dur-
ing the post-WWII or Cold War era of international relations. It has been during
that time that many structures and rules of international law that are nowadays
taken for granted have been codified and have crystallized—particularly with re-
spect to rules on the use of force. Indeed, it has been during that era that any
possible doctrines of humanitarian intervention that may have existed in the past
have been more or less unanimously cast aside.155 Previously, it was noted that
force-justifying arguments that relied on a right to humanitarian intervention were
hardly employed at all from 1945 to 1990.156 Furthermore, the arguments that
were advanced by writers in support of such a right were generally agreed to be
unconvincing.157 The oft-quoted assessment of the state of international law with
regard to this question, put forward by the British Foreign Ministry in 1986, is
152Rytter 2001, p. 158. See also Aro—Petman 1999, p. 127.
153The influence that the United States wields on the international arena hardly needs to be
elaborated upon. From this perspective, one can consider the way in which international law has
been described as an aspect of hegemonic contestation—see Koskenniemi 2004. On the use of force
by the United States and its effect on international law, see Kohen 2003, in particular p. 219–220
on humanitarian intervention.
154There are fields of study where it is entirely inappropriate to attempt to explicitly point out
the putative motives of a participant in a debate; in particular, this includes the physical sciences
where ad hominem arguments are strongly discouraged. To what extent they can be employed in
international law either implicitly or explicitly may be a matter of debate.
155See e.g. Chesterman 2001, p. 49–52. Note also the Corfu Channel case (1949).
156See above, p. 43; see also Aro—Petman 1999, p. 128.
157Gray 2000, p. 28.
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lucid evidence in support of this position, even though it does acknowledge the
option of considering some occurrences of humanitarian intervention legal:
“[T]he best case that can be made in support of humanitarian inter-
vention is that it cannot be said to be unambiguously illegal. [. . . ] But
the overwhelming majority of contemporary legal opinion comes down
against the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention [. . . ]”158
One relatively early article that explores the legality of unauthorized humanitar-
ian intervention in the post-WWII system is the classic “Thoughts on Kind-Hearted
Gunmen” by Brownlie (1973).159 Brownlie’s arguments speak clearly against a
right of humanitarian intervention that would fall outside the legal boundaries
of the Charter system. According to Brownlie, doctrines of humanitarian interven-
tion that may have existed before were invalidated by the changes in international
law that the Charter system brought with it.160 Indeed, it is noted in the arti-
cle that writings in favor of a right of humanitarian intervention up to 1973 had
been “characterized by an isolation which is remarkable.”161 This should serve as
evidence of the fact that there was considerably wide-ranging agreement on the
illegality of unauthorized humanitarian interventions during the Cold War era. As
noted above, the arguments that were presented in favor of humanitarian inter-
vention could have been tainted by unspoken foreign policy goals or could also
stem from a lack of understanding of the Charter system and its genesis, goals and
purpose. Whatever the reasons, opinions in support of unauthorized humanitarian
interventions were undeniably in the minority from 1945 onwards.
The underlying arguments—legal as well as practical—for and against interven-
tion were also weighed by Brownlie. In his view, a restrictive approach serves
to “keep out of circulation disastrously vague and unworkable principles of self-
limitation.”162 One of the central goals of the Charter system was to avoid further
conflagrations of the type of the Second World War, caused by the pre-war reality
where the League of Nations and the international community in general were
unable to keep at bay those nations that simply chose to confer upon themselves
the capacity to use force in situations where the nations themselves thought it
15857 (1986) British Yearbook of International Law, p. 618–619.
159Brownlie 1973. “Early” here refers to the fact that the 1990s were a turning point for doctrines
of humanitarian intervention, as described above.
160Brownlie 1973, p. 142–143.
161Brownlie 1973, p. 144.
162Brownlie 1973, p. 145.
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justified or necessary.163 A system that allows for unauthorized humanitarian in-
tervention would have flown in the face of such an approach; thus, it would have
been completely antithetical to the Charter system, at least and particularly when
one takes into account the international political realities of the polarized Cold
War-era world—including but not limited to the obvious potential for abuse and
the failure of proponents of intervention to come up with adequate definitions to
facilitate a doctrine of unauthorized humanitarian intervention.
In his article, Brownlie also considered the argument that situations where a per-
manent member of the Security Council employs the veto and thus bars the Coun-
cil from authorizing intervention could somehow be construed as situations where
the United Nations is “ineffective.” His counterargument is threefold: firstly, effi-
cacy can never fulfil “the normative goal it aspires to”; secondly, the veto is a
procedure defined in the Charter; and thirdly, the concept of effectiveness is “su-
perficial and defective.”164 It is the opinion of the present writer that the second
argument is the most important one—and closely related to the first one: the core
of the problem can be succinctly summed up by pointing out the fact that when
the veto is employed, it is serving the exact purpose it was given in the Charter,
unless that purpose is defined as an abstract “effectiveness” in every case that can
hardly be fulfilled in reality in any case. Oversimplifying somewhat, the question is
whether the veto would ever be applicable if its meaning could be annulled by re-
ferring to the “ineffectiveness” it causes. Naturally, the argument can be made that
the veto can be abused in violation of the “purpose” of the Charter.165 However,
in the view of the present author, one of the main functions of the Security Coun-
cil procedures is to formalize decision-making between members of the Council;
therefore, if unwritten exceptions are resorted to when a single country sees fit,
this entire notion of formalizing such relations is threatened.166
Not only did Brownlie contend that there is little evidence in support of the view
that humanitarian intervention would be supported by law, but he also voiced his
practical-political-ethical opinion that such doctrines are unlikely to function as “a
genuine instrument for the benefit of mankind.” In his view, the very concept of
163As is well-known, the Preamble of the Charter explicitly notes the determination to “save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold
sorrow to mankind.”
164Brownlie 1973, p. 145–146.
165See later, p. 53.
166In other words, disregarding the veto could be seen as eroding the legal certainty that the
Charter system brought to international law, even though the Council is a political organ. Elements
of legal certainty can be said to be central to any system that at least purports to be based on the
Rule of Law.
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humanitarian intervention is in conflict with “the needs of modern international
life.”167 His closing observations on the dangers of humanitarian intervention are
still relevant and applicable to later events—particularly in light of cases such
as the arguably dubious interventions in Panama and elsewhere.168 Even though
there have been major changes on the international arena since the end of the Cold
War, Brownlie’s concerns remain surprisingly valid and are worth keeping in mind
as the question of humanitarian intervention in the present system of international
law is examined.
Concluding observation. During the Cold War era, “humanitarian intervention” in
the absence of Council authorization was widely considered to be incompatible
with the Charter system. Arguments in favor of a cautionary approach towards
the problem have not lost their relevance today and may indeed be even more
topical than before in the current single-superpower reality.
167Brownlie 1973, p. 147.
168The Panama intervention is an example of the use of force to (allegedly) maintain or re-
establish democracy—a doctrine that enjoys little international support at present and is arguably
deeply incompatible with the Charter system. See e.g. Chesterman 2001, p. 102–106, for discus-
sion of the controversy surrounding the Panama case.
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5 The Legality of Illegality
The case of the Kosovo intervention proved to be a conundrum that appeared
insurmountable to many international lawyers.169 This is apparent when one ex-
amines the debate that took place within international law circles during and after
the Kosovo campaign. Hannikainen describes the Kosovo problem as a ‘tough nut
to crack’ for international lawyers,170 and it is ironic—or on closer inspection, quite
telling—that the Decade of International Law would end with a crisis involving a
collision between two fundamental doctrines of international law, namely, human
rights and the ban on the use of force in international relations.
A closer examination of the Kosovo case and the debate surrounding its implica-
tions shall now be undertaken, with the goal of considering the possibility of a
defensible solution to the main question of the acceptability of intervention. Thus,
the issue is whether the Kosovo intervention was a harbinger of things to come or
a mere aberration, and what the position is which would be judicious to support
as regards the legal effects of that intervention—and on a more general level, of
interventions described as “humanitarian.” The foregoing discussion on purport-
edly universal human rights doctrines and the benefits and on pitfalls of enforcing
them through the use of military force will serve as the underlying background to
the examination that follows.
5.1 Effectively Paralyzed?
If one attempts to look for justification for the Kosovo intervention—and for hu-
manitarian intervention without Security Council authorization in general—more
or less strictly in a legalistic manner within the confines of international law, i.e.,
without resort to ethical arguments, several options exist. On a general level,
Harhoff identifies three different strains of legal positions on the Kosovo issue:
the affirmative position which is favorable to the possibility of humanitarian inter-
vention having a legal basis in international law; the legalist position which holds
that legal justifications for humanitarian intervention cannot be found; and the
169For example, Hannikainen points out that both he and Simma had major difficulties in ana-
lyzing the use of force by NATO from the point of view of international law. Hannikainen 1999,
p. 82.
170Hannikainen 1999, p. 76, translated here by the present author (the original formulation in
Finnish, “Kosovon katastrofi on kansainvälisen oikeuden tutkijalle kova pala,” sums up the main
dilemma quite adequately.)
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reformist position where it is contended that a clear answer to the question can-
not be provided by the current system of international law and that the system
should therefore be reformed so that conditions for intervention could be identi-
fied.171 The approaches to the Kosovo problem taken by different commentators,
described in the following sections, do not always fall neatly into these categories;
furthermore, arguments regarding extra-legal exits from the problem of humani-
tarian intervention (in particular, “one-time” extra-legal escapes from the problem
of Kosovo) seem to form a category of their own, possibly subsidiary to some of
the positions identified by Harhoff.
If we now examine the affirmative positions more closely, Gowlland-Debbas di-
vides these arguments into four groups: the implied authorization argument, the
implied powers doctrine, ex post facto legitimization and the theory of emerging
norms of humanitarian intervention.172 The implied authorization view argues that
existing resolutions of the Security Council can be interpreted as providing legal
justification for the Kosovo intervention. According to Gowlland-Debbas, this ap-
proach also implies an awareness of the need for Security Council approval for
military intervention on the part of the states that invoke this argument. Previ-
ously, Security Council Resolutions 687 and 688 had been employed as “blanket”
justifications for intervention in Northern Iraq—a strategy that had been met with
little international outcry. Regardless of the lack of condemnation, Resolutions 687
and 688 have not been considered particularly convincing arguments in favor of
intervention; thus, the same approach should be considered inapplicable in the
case of Kosovo, especially when major actors on the international arena oppose
it.173 For authorization to exist, it would have to be given explicitly by the Security
Council, not implicitly, particularly when the matter concerns a fundamental norm
of international law such as the prohibition on the use of force.
The implied powers doctrine is based on an extended interpretation of Chapters
VII and VIII of the United Nations Charter. It is quite clear in the Charter that re-
gional organizations in the sense of Chapter VIII will always need authorization
from the Security Council for the use of force—unless, of course, they can claim
171Harhoff 2001, p. 78–108.
172Gowlland-Debbas 2000, p. 372–377.
173In particular, Res. 688 was not adopted under Ch. VII. See Gowlland-Debbas, p. 372–373.
Gowlland-Debbas notes: “[I]t has been seen that neither delegation of the Council’s powers nor
authorization of acts normally unlawful under international law can lightly be made.” For discus-
sion of the problems raised by the interpretation of Res. 688, see Chesterman 2001, p. 196–206. In
particular, Chesterman notes (p. 201) that “[. . . ] statements made in the Security Council confirm
that [Res. 688] was not understood to authorize an enforcement action [. . . ]”
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justification through self-defense.174 According to the implied powers interpreta-
tion as presented by Gowlland-Debbas, a “paralyzed” Security Council would give
regional arrangements or non-Chapter VIII organizations such as NATO “residual
responsibility” for the maintenance of peace and security in the same way that
the General Assembly attempted to give itself similar responsibilities through the
Uniting for Peace resolution.175 However, as Gowlland-Debbas points out, that reso-
lution only amounted to “a transfer of responsibility from one principal U.N. organ
to another”—in other words, NATO is not the General Assembly.
As is apparent, the implied powers interpretation depends on the acceptance of
the idea that the Security Council can be “inefficient” or “paralyzed.”176 The im-
plied powers doctrine and acceptance of the paralysis argument imply that the
“absoluteness” of the power of Council resolutions (or of the lack of them) can be
successfully challenged on extra-legal, that is, political or moral, grounds. How-
ever, it would seem that one problem with such an argument is that the Council’s
decision-making is political in the first place. In other words, if we assumed that
the sphere of politics encompasses or subsumes the sphere of “law” in the inter-
national system,177 it would still not follow that a political decision by a group of
(politically powerful) nations could override the opinion of the Security Council,
as the Council happens to be a political organ. The implied powers argument ap-
pears illogical and contradictory from another—but nevertheless related—point of
view as well: the veto is an integral part of the Security Council’s procedure, and
claiming that a permanent member using the veto is tantamount to “paralysis”
would nullify the significance of the veto, as discussed earlier.178
Furthermore, as Gowlland-Debbas points out, the applicability of the implied pow-
ers doctrine in the case of Kosovo is limited by the fact that there was no attempt
by NATO members to seek authorization from the Security Council due to the fact
that it was apparent from the positions taken by China and Russia that no such
174Note the non-Ch. VIII status of NATO, discussed on p. 45 of this study, and Art. 53 quoted
supra.
175As Chesterman points out, the legal status of the Uniting for Peace resolution is questionable.
Chesterman 2001, p. 118. Cf. Simma 1999, p. 17.
176Gowlland-Debbas 2000, p. 373–374. Cf. discussion on Brownlie above, p. 49.
177The distinction here may be only a semantic one: for example, Koskenniemi (2004, p. 199)
describes international law as appearing “as a way of dressing political claims in a specialised
technical idiom in the conditions of hegemonic contestation.”
178See the discussion on Brownlie above, p. 49. See also e.g. Watson 1999, p. 247, where it is
stated with regard to the veto that “[t]he use of a legal power granted in a treaty can hardly be
said to be an unforeseeable departure from the scheme of the treaty regime such as to invalidate
other provisions in the treaty which were drafted and negotiated at the same time.”
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authorization would be forthcoming.179 Therefore, claiming that the Council was
“paralyzed” in the Kosovo case is highly contestable, as no draft resolution was put
to a vote.
It is interesting to look at the problem of seeking authorization vs. not seeking au-
thorization from the Security Council as an unsolvable game-theoretical problem
that seems to touch upon the fundamentals of international law and politics.180 On
the one hand, should a nation or a group of nations seek Security Council approval
for intervention and fail to receive it due to a permanent member employing the
veto, then the Council has not been “paralyzed” but has acted within its powers—
i.e., through its normal voting procedures—to deny the right to use force on the
basis of Ch. VII. Thus, there would be no room for the implied powers argument.
On the other hand, should the interveners opt to refrain from seeking approval,
then the implied powers doctrine is inapplicable due to the very lack of any pur-
ported “paralysis” described above, as the Security Council has not even rejected
any request for the use of force. Therefore, it appears to be impossible to justify
the use of force through the implied powers doctrine, regardless of whether or
not one puts to the Security Council a draft resolution in support of intervention.
Arguing that a view of this type leads to a system where there is no way to receive
authorization for an action that is “required” or “necessary” isn’t a logical path of
argumentation, as it is through the procedures of the Security Council that the “re-
quiredness” of an action is defined. Of course, this would be a legalistic stance, and
any counter-arguments based on morality or ethics would have the same benefits
and drawbacks as any other moral-ethical arguments in international law. — One
should also note Gowlland-Debbas’ observation that an “implied power” is difficult
to argue for if the action that is justified through such an argument goes against
an express prohibition in the United Nations Charter such as Art. 2(4) or Art. 51,
as was the case with the Kosovo intervention.181
As for ex post facto legitimation of the Kosovo intervention, Gowlland-Debbas ac-
curately notes that it is unclear whether Security Council resolutions do legitimize
179Gowlland-Debbas 2000, p. 374. Hannikainen 1999, p. 82, contends that China as a permanent
member of the Council mostly seems to be concerned about her national interests. It can perhaps
be stated that similar criticisms could also apply to other permanent members as well.
180In game theory—a field of study which has its roots in mathematics and economics but which
has found applicability in the social sciences as well—outcomes of different strategic decisions
are analyzed, often with the goal of discovering the optimal course of action. In this example, an
“optimal” legal strategy may not exist.
181Gowlland-Debbas 2000, p. 374, and Simma 1999, p. 19. Compare Hannikainen, who argues
that the jus cogens prohibition only applies to the use or threat of force whose purpose is aggressive
and that the NATO action did not fulfil the definition of aggressive purpose. Hannikainen 1999,
p. 82, wherein reference is made to Hannikainen 1988, p. 323–356.
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actions that have been taken previously. As she mentions, there are numerous fac-
tors in the Kosovo case that support the contention that the Security Council did
not approve of the operation ex post facto. The debate in the Council that took
place was in many places critical of the Kosovo operation, which was readily ap-
parent in the statements presented by China and Brazil, among others.182 There-
fore, the Security Council resolution that followed that debate, Resolution 1244,
cannot be seen as an “endorsement” of the Kosovo operation.183
A draft resolution sponsored by Belarus, India and Russia which would have called
for an end to the NATO action had been rejected previously,184 but this rejection
cannot be taken to mean that the Council would somehow have implicitly ap-
proved of the operation or would approve of it afterwards: it does not follow that
a failure by the Security Council to arrive at a consensus in a particular matter
would mean taking a stand for a given position. Furthermore, one must keep in
mind the fact that the Security Council often deals with situations that are a re-
sult of actions illegal under international law.185 When the Council handles such a
matter, it would be illogical to claim that the absence of an explicit condemnation
of past events could be interpreted as an implicit approval of those events. This is
particularly true in the case of Kosovo.
When it comes to emerging “norms of humanitarian intervention” as justification,
it has been argued that the rejection of the aforementioned draft resolution could
have a contributing effect to the status of such norms.186 It is the view of the
present writer that the rejection carried little significance and was at best no more
and no less than a slight indication of the opposition to humanitarian intervention,
particularly when viewed against the background of the clear absence of humani-
tarian intervention norms in the post-1945 system in general.187
182Gowlland-Debbas 2000, p. 375.
183Ibid. Gowlland-Debbas points out that China emphasized “the commitment of all member
states to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” Cf. Franck’s
statement that S/RES/1244 “on the one hand, seems to usher in an era of legally sanctioned
intervention on behalf of globally recognized humanitarian and human rights law and, on the
other hand, seems resigned to having such intervention conducted by states in disregard of the
United Nations itself.” Franck 1999, p. 859.
184Chesterman 2001, p. 213. Greenwood 1999, p. 151–152.
185Simma 1999, p. 11: “[T]he fact is that the Security Council, as a political organ entrusted with
the maintenance or restoration of peace and security rather than as an enforcer of international
law, will in many instances have to accept or build upon facts or situations based on, or involving,
illegalities.” See also Gowlland-Debbas 2000, p. 376, note 18, on the draft resolution.
186See Gowlland-Debbas 2000, p. 376–377.
187See p. 47 of this study. Cf. the aforementioned statement in 57 (1986) BYIL, p. 618–619.
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In the view of Gowlland-Debbas, the role of the Security Council is not legislative
and its position is therefore not an indication of “requisite state practice” for the
creation of a new customary rule of humanitarian intervention. Of course, as she
points out, the difficulty in assessing the significance of the practice of a political
organ is apparent.188 The weight that should be given to decisions of the Security
Council from this point of view is somewhat unclear. Still, in this case, it seems
safe to make a statement—as Gowlland-Debbas does—with regard to the impact
that Security Council decisions might have had in the case of Kosovo: a jus cogens
rule such as the norms on the use of force can hardly be said to be changeable in
a situation where two permanent members of the Security Council opposed the
action that would have led to a change in the rule.189
One further possibility that has been raised as a legal justification for humanitar-
ian intervention is the argument based on a state of necessity in extreme cases.
As Rytter puts it, there is in customary international law the norm that in ex-
ceptional circumstances, acts incompatible with international law may be accept-
able.190 However, a strong indication of the limits of the doctrine of a state of
necessity can be found by examining the ILC draft articles on the matter, referred
to by Rytter: not just any “exceptional circumstances” will do, as the illegal ac-
tion will have to be the “only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the
state against a grave and imminent imperil” for it to be acceptable. It is easy to
agree with Rytter’s conclusion that humanitarian suffering does not fulfil these re-
quirements and that intervention would instead impair an essential interest of the
state that is the target of intervention—namely, territorial integrity.191 Of course,
avoiding humanitarian suffering is only (sic) “an essential interest of the world,”
as Rytter describes it, and “the world” or “the international community” cannot be
said to be a “state” that could resort to a state of necessity; and even though it is
individual states that would carry out an intervention, their essential interests are
not as directly threatened as is the territorial integrity of the target state. However,
it is the view of the present writer that even though the doctrine of a state of ne-
cessity cannot be used to justify humanitarian intervention, it doesn’t preclude its
acceptability, either.192
188Gowlland-Debbas 2000, p. 377.
189Ibid. Note, however, that “only very few states contended that the action on the part of NATO
countries was contrary to the United Charter in that it violated Article 2(4),” as Cassese points out.
Cassese 1999, p. 792.
190Rytter 2001, p. 133.
191Rytter 2001, p. 134–135.
192In other words, the sphere of applicability of the state of necessity doctrine doesn’t necessarily
encompass all situations where “exceptional circumstances” can function as justification for illegal
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The conclusion offered by Gowlland-Debbas—that central to the issue was the re-
lationship of the international legal system and ethics and politics—seems appro-
priate. However, the complexities apparent in the “continuous adjustment”193 that
takes place within the system of international law highlights the uncertainty and
ambiguity inherent in the international system as regards the foundations upon
which this continuous adjustment should be based. Even though the different le-
gal avenues, enumerated above, that have been used to attempt to legally justify
the Kosovo intervention can be rejected after careful examination, it is the ad hoc
nature of the system where the examination takes place that necessarily results
in indeterminacy.194 Every legal system195 necessarily has gray areas of ambigu-
ity, but the international lawyer who attempts to find a solution to a “hard case”
should nevertheless remain wary of arguments that are based on an overly flexible
interpretation of the rules of international law. This is a fact that is worth keeping
in mind with respect to the interpretation of fundamental norms such as those on
the use of force, due to the dangers such approaches necessarily entail.
Concluding observation. An overview of the spectrum of possible legal justifications
for the Kosovo intervention—or, indeed, for any intervention unauthorized by the
Council but described as “humanitarian” by its implementors—demonstrates the
fact that attempts at legal vindication are either unconvincing or fail to avoid
straying from the scope of legality into the murky field of ethics. This holds true
particularly well for arguments that rely on the concept of “ineffectiveness” or
“paralysis” of the Council.
actions; therefore, even if exceptional circumstances fail to fulfil the definition required by the
necessity defense, they may still have relevance.
193Gowlland-Debbas 2000, p. 381.
194Whenever the present writer has been asked to define the meaning of “ad hoc,” the concise
formulation “ad hoc is that what international law is” has proved most useful in informal contexts.
However, such a primitive appraisal of the nature of international law is unlikely to prove helpful
in the present work.
195This may not be true for some theoretical legal systems that are based on formal logic; however,
it is the opinion of the present writer that it holds true for any realistically implementable real-
world system of law. Even if a legal system was completely self-consistent, its “interface” with
reality would be a source of ambiguity. Cf. Koskenniemi 1989, p. 449: “The idea that law can
provide objective resolutions to actual disputes is premised on the assumption that legal concepts
have a meaning which is present in them in some intrinsic way, that at least their core meanings
can be verified in an objective fashion. But modern linguistics has taught us that concepts do not
have such natural meanings. In one way or other, meanings are determined by the conceptual
scheme in which the concept appears.”
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5.2 From Justifying Intervention to Mystifying Criteria
Apparent during the Kosovo crisis and in its aftermath was the ardor with which
certain writers attempted to justify the intervention either through moral-ethical
or legal means. The manner in which arguments in favor of the NATO operation
were presented makes the critical reader wonder whether the unauthorized nature
of the action in fact only boosted the enthusiasm of some supporters of humani-
tarian intervention. The fact that “military humanitarianism” so suddenly gained a
real-life victory in the sense of the doctrine actually being executed, the fact that it
happened with apparent disregard for the rules of international law on the use of
force, and the fact that the situation in the Security Council initially appeared to
block any possibility of military action, may have triggered a sense of vindication,
if not triumphalism, in certain circles. Furthermore, the fact that proceedings in
the International Court of Justice were instituted against NATO member countries
by Yugoslavia196 served as a compelling reason—with regard to both the proceed-
ings and the political arena—to attempt to formulate more precise justifications
within the debate that took place after the operation.
Reisman puts particular emphasis on the exceptional nature of the Kosovo case.197
He is reluctant to abandon the current use of force régime or to bend the current
system so that the intervention could be justified through legal means. Instead, he
emphasizes the need for what he calls procedural integrity, as he recognizes that
stepping outside the boundaries of law entails the risk of eroding the status of
law and increases the potential for abusing it. Still, Reisman holds that there exist
situations where decisions have to be taken without regard to the procedures of
law—referring to Holmes’ view of constitutions not being “suicide pacts.” Even in
light of his willingness to support such measures, Reisman is still concerned of the
possible consequences of the Kosovo operation in the future.198
In Reisman’s view, the human rights violations in Kosovo were serious enough
to warrant action, and from a practical perspective, all other policies to end the
violence had failed. Even though he does encourage a careful approach with re-
gard to making exceptions to the rules on the use of force, he maintains an over-
whelmingly positive stance towards the Kosovo intervention while acknowledging
the problems involved. The underlying philosophy of “military humanitarianism”
196See Legality of the Use of Force.
197Reisman 1999, p. 860–862: “Kosovo bears no likeness to previous examples of humanitarian
intervention which were, to varying degrees, for all their high rhetoric, instruments of policy of
particular states, whose commitment to human rights was not always consistent or credible.”
198Ibid.
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seems quite apparent in his statement regarding the possibility of Kosovo being
a bad precedent for the future: “One may equally ask whether a better prece-
dent would be that no one may do anything effective to stop the destruction or
expulsion of the Kosovars of the future, if the Security Council proves unable to
operate?”199
In terms of the practical problems related to the Kosovo case, Reisman’s contention
that the case bore little to no likeness to previous cases does have a certain level of
validity: in particular, one aspect that should be considered further is the fact that
it was the first post-Cold War situation where humanitarian needs and the legal
régime on the use of force collided so spectacularly. In this sense, the Kosovo case
may have demonstrated a major shift in the system of international law. However,
to the present writer it would seem that Kosovo displayed a change in the political
realities of the world than in international law itself—of course, this is a line that
is hard to draw.200 The controversial nature of the Kosovo situation seems to stem
from the fact that difficult cases were “swept under the rug” in the Cold War sys-
tem of a deadlocked Security Council—i.e., they never came under strict scrutiny
because of the political realities of the time. With the cataclysmic changes that took
place in Europe and the world in the early 1990s, it became possible for human
rights violations to be addressed by the Security Council—and, in fact, for major
human rights violations to reoccur in Europe; nevertheless, whether such changes
actually led to a legal change is a separate question.201 Furthermore, Simma states
that the question that arose was “how [...] even the purest humanitarian motives
behind military intervention [could] overcome the formidable international legal
obstacles” (emphasis added).202
The overall impression of Reisman’s argumentation that comes across from
his commentary is the way in which there seems to be an underlying pro-
interventionist position that guides his interpretation of the “facts on the ground”:
to state Reisman’s opinion simplistically, he views the Kosovo case as “serious
enough” for the law to be bypassed. However, from a more legal standpoint, such
specific in casu assessments of whether a given situation fulfils a given requirement
do not necessarily constitute a compelling argument. Of course, such ethical—and
political—positions may be considered convincing, but legal argumentation must
199Reisman 1999, p. 861.
200See above, e.g., p. 53.
201See Simma 1999, p. 5: “The question which arises [. . . ] is, of course, whether the state of the
law [. . . ] could have changed in recent years, possibly after the demise of the East–West conflict or
under the shock of the genocide and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia.”
202Simma 1999, p. 5–6.
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be more refined than a naïve fallback to (more or less subjective) morality. A de-
tailed, if ultimately unconvincing, attempt at providing such a legal justification is
provided by Brenfors and Petersen in their article defending “unilateral humanitar-
ian intervention.”203
The goal of Brenfors and Petersen is to formulate legal arguments in favor of hu-
manitarian intervention without the authorization of the Security Council. One of
the main positions they put forward is the notion that rules in international law
should be interpreted teleologically, i.e., so that decisions satisfy the intent of the
rules. Furthermore, according to their view, the international system should not
be seen as a strictly legal enterprise; instead, one should also view it as a system
of “power play.”204 In other words, ruling on the legality of humanitarian inter-
vention should be done so that the “power play” aspect and the underlying intent
of the rules are also taken into account.205 The fact that such an argument can be
at least plausibly presented illustrates the exceptional nature of the debate. It is
symptomatic to the issue that an article that purports to provide legal arguments—
in fact, favoring a certain outcome in the case against NATO countries which was
at the time of the publication of the article ongoing in the International Court of
Justice206—appears to question the “legal” nature of the entire system, though in
a slightly roundabout way.
Brenfors and Petersen refer to Dworkin’s theory on hard cases: the judge / lawyer
should endeavor to find the underlying raison d’être of and the fundamental prin-
ciples behind the rules that are to be interpreted.207 If one is to accept this view,
as they suggest, making a decision on the lawfulness of the Kosovo intervention
may be colored “by the fundamental goals of the international community.”208
However, if we assume that the basic legal problem with the NATO action was
the conflict between sovereignty and human rights, the approach of Brenfors and
Petersen does not solve this problem, as it just replaces it with a slightly different
reformulation of the same issue. First, if we need to come to some sort of a con-
clusion regarding the interplay between sovereignty on the one hand and human
203Brenfors—Petersen 2000.
204Brenfors—Petersen 2000, p. 450–451.
205Brenfors and Petersen contend that the “issue is infiltrated by both the political realities and
moral considerations,” thus: “A satisfactory solution to the problem of the legality of humanitar-
ian intervention can [. . . ] best be reached when accepting the interaction between disciplines.”
Brenfors—Petersen 2000, p. 451–452.
206The case was subsequently dismissed on grounds of lack of jurisdiction by the Court. See
Legality of Use of Force, Judgment of 15 December 2004.
207Brenfors—Petersen 2000, p. 455. They make reference to Dworkin, Ronald (1978): Taking
rights seriously. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1978)
208Brenfors—Petersen 2000, p. 456.
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rights on the other, we find that there is little agreement on which one should
be given precedence over the other. Then, to solve this problem, we are to turn
to the teleological legal technique which directs us to look at the “fundamental
goals of the international community.” The question thus becomes whether it is
sovereignty or human rights that can be found at the “root” of the values of the
international community. However, this is the original problem that we set out to
solve; it thus appears that a satisfactory answer would remain elusive in spite of
the approach suggested.
According to Brenfors and Petersen, the “classical” interpretation of the prohibition
of the threat or use of force in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter is that it is a blanket
prohibition, i.e., only those exceptions limit its range that have been explicitly
stipulated in the Charter. Brenfors and Petersen examine in more detail the Article
in question and Article 51 plus the human right provisions in the Charter and draw
the conclusion that the “classical,” narrow interpretation of Article 2(4) may “at
one time have been the acceptable view,” but such norms “must be taken as [. . . ]
constantly living.” Their main contention with regard to Articles 2(4) and 51 and
the human rights provisions is that the changing situation on the international
arena has resulted in a situation where the said sections of the Charter must be
interpreted in a more flexible manner that takes the current state of affairs into
account in an adequate way.209
To elaborate, one specific position of Brenfors and Petersen is that the Charter pro-
visions on the use of force and self-defense had their genesis in the goal of avoiding
a repetition of the policies that led to the Second World War as discussed previ-
ously in the present study. According to them, the original goal is “not responsive
to the challenges to world peace of today, particularly the escalating violations of
human rights.”210 However, while there is a certain level of validity to be found in
this argument, one must consider the fact that it was during the World War that
some of the most massive human rights violations in the 20th Century—possibly
in human history—took place. As a result of those violations, the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights and the human rights provisions in the Articles of the U.N.
Charter were drafted—clear evidence of the fact that human rights were not over-
209Brenfors—Petersen 2000, p. 473–476. Brenfors and Petersen assert that the rebus sic stantibus
doctrine is applicable mutatis mutandis so that the Security Council can lose its relevance as the
arbiter of Ch. VII enforcement if it is “ineffective.”
210Brenfors—Petersen 2000, p. 167.
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looked in the drafting of the Charter, even though they were “only” an emerging
doctrine at the time.211
However, the question of humanitarian intervention was not explicitly addressed
in the Charter. As has been discussed, even if there had been a pre-Charter norm
of humanitarian intervention, it was no longer a valid doctrine in the wake of
WWII.212 The framers of the Charter were undoubtedly aware of the dilemma
of how to deal with (potentially beneficial) doctrines in the “just war” spirit but
nevertheless did not address the question, even though the human rights violations
of WWII were more extreme in magnitude than those taking place today. It was
both threats to peace and violations of fundamental human rights that the world
community wanted to avoid because of the experiences of the war; still, it was
the issue of peace that was emphasized in the Charter, not human rights. Thus,
it is illogical to claim that a right to humanitarian intervention, an exception to
one of the most central rules of the international legal system, could be arrived at
through such interpretations of the U.N. Charter as those attempted by Brenfors
and Petersen.
On the other hand, one could argue that de-emphasizing human rights over
sovereignty was a conscious choice because of the political realities of the time,
and thus human rights were never afforded the status they should have gained;
in other words, now that there is a possibility to give human rights the influential
position they deserved in the Charter but failed to attain, that possibility should
be seized. However, this counter-argument is not immune to criticism, either: the
prohibition on the use of force was much less controversial than the idea of hu-
man rights, as is obvious from the history of the drafting of the Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.213 From this point of view, the ban on the
use of force has such weight that it would be exaggerated to claim that human
rights provisions could provide an exception to it.
The same considerations also apply to further comparisons between the prohibi-
tion on the use of force and the human rights provisions codified in the Charter and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Brenfors and Petersen argue that the
increasing importance of human rights on the world agenda—the “drastic turn to
internationalisation of human rights” as they put it—must be taken into account
211See p. 40 of the present study. See also Ignatieff 2001, p. 5–12, on the genesis and emergence
of human rights with regard to the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
212See p. 47 of the present study.
213See Ignatieff 2001, e.g., p. 5–6, where the results of the Universal Declaration are described as
a “revolution”; cf. the relatively uncontroversial pre-Charter attempts to create an effective ban on
the use of force (see p. 39 of the present study.)
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when interpreting international law in a teleological manner.214 In other words,
one should assess the purpose of Article 2(4) and consider whether that is com-
patible with the “weighty human rights purposes of the international community.”
Brenfors and Petersen draw the conclusion that humanitarian considerations must
take precedence and sovereignty has to yield. In addition to introducing to the
problem the unnecessary difficulties involved with definining the purposes and
intentions of the international community, Brenfors and Petersen succumb to the
fundamental flaw described above—the argument is a circular one.
As for the argument that declarations made subsequent to the United Nations
Charter, such as the Friendly Relations Declaration and the Definition of Aggres-
sion, could be used to determine the extent of Article 2(4) and possibly limit the
range of doctrines of humanitarian intervention, Brenfors and Petersen assert that
those agreements are not relevant to the inquiry at hand, as they must be con-
sidered in light of the time and the political environment in which they were
adopted—i.e., the Cold War.215 However, these agreements are nevertheless valid
sources of international law. It would not be a justifiable argument to employ a
piecemeal approach whereby certain agreements are considered important and
others are not; and if such an approach was not employed, what would bar one
from claiming that the entire United Nations Charter is no longer applicable be-
cause it, too, is a product of the time and the political environment in which it was
adopted? Of course, this does not mean that an “all-or-nothing” approach where
all agreements are either honored or discarded regardless of the circumstances in
which they were entered into would be the only acceptable one; nevertheless, it is
illogical to simply pick those agreements and provisions that support one side of
a dispute and dismiss the applicability of others on the grounds that the circum-
stances have changed since those agreements or declarations were made.
Moreover, Brenfors and Petersen argue that unilateral humanitarian intervention
has been verboten in the Charter system not because of the ban on the use of force
but because the Charter imposed a collective system where the Security Council
takes precedence. In other words, intervention is prohibited not because it consti-
tutes use of force but because it is unilateral. Therefore, they claim, humanitarian
intervention is allowed (only) when the multilateral arrangement of the Security
Council has become ineffective. However, this argument follows the same flawed
logic that has been discussed previously with regard to the paralysis or ineffec-
tiveness argument: if a group of powerful states is unsatisfied with the outcome
214Brenfors—Petersen 2000, p. 470.
215Brenfors—Petersen 2000, p. 472–473.
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of a vote in the Security Council, can they subsequently make a unilateral deci-
sion regarding the Security Council’s ineffectiveness to justify their actions?216 It
would be more logical to argue that the Council has used its position in an effective
manner in accordance with the procedures defined in the United Nations Charter.
According to Brenfors and Petersen, a right to unilateral enforcement of rights
recognized by the international community is triggered when those rights cannot
be enforced (multilaterally) through the international system.217 Again, this argu-
ment presupposes that individual rights take precedence over sovereignty, which is
equivalent to returning to the original question—and ignores the pragmatic prob-
lem of opening up a Pandora’s box of abuse. Moreover, the delineation between
“clear aggression in violation of the rules of the international community” ver-
sus “humanitarian intervention to enforce rights that cannot be protected by the
international community” is one of considerable ambiguity.
As with most legal arguments in favor of humanitarian intervention, the view put
forward by Brenfors and Petersen only appears to provide justification for that
which it presupposes: human rights considerations override the ban on the use of
force because human rights considerations override the ban on the use of force. It
could be claimed, as has been done, that such arguments—i.e., that rights prevail
over sovereignty—depend on an individualistic, Western, even Eurocentric, view
of “rights.”218 Similar criticism can also be leveled against those parts of the ar-
gument that concentrate on the “intentions of the founding fathers” of the United
Nations.219 Their intent will be hard to infer, and such an approach also brings with
it a multitude of new issues, such as how one should deal with the Soviet Union
under Stalin being one of those founding fathers of the Charter system whose in-
tentions we are attempting to deduce. Such approaches either assume a certain
conception of “rights” and / or bring with them difficult practical problems.
In the end, the legalistic approach to justifying humanitarian intervention by Bren-
fors and Petersen is well-argued and carefully constructed but ultimately flawed. If
a doctrine of humanitarian intervention does not exist in customary international
law and that fact is generally agreed upon within the international community,
216Cf. the discussion on p. 49 and p. 53 of the present study. See also Simma 1999, p. 19: “[N]o
unanimity of NATO member states can do away with the limits to which these states are subject
under peremptory international law (jus cogens) outside the organization [. . . ] NATO is allowed to
do everthing that is legally permissible, but no more.”
217Brenfors—Petersen 2000, p. 475–476.
218See, in particular, Chapter 2.1 of the present study for discussion on the individualistic charac-
teristics of human rights doctrines.
219Brenfors and Petersen employ the idea of the “founding fathers” of the United Nations (see e.g.
Brenfors—Petersen 2000, p. 498)—a concept that harkens back to American constitutional dis-
course and perhaps also evokes unintended associations of American foreign policy in the reader.
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such a norm cannot be conjured out of thin air through legal argumentation, no
matter how elaborate those legal concoctions might be. It may be appropriate to
agree with Falk here in that the problem cannot be solved by international law
alone; according to him, “reliance on legalistic analysis is particularly unfortunate
for the future of international law.”220
The foregoing discussion brings up the question of whether it is beneficial to at-
tempt to define legal, political or moral criteria for judging the acceptability or
justifiability of humanitarian interventions. Wheeler seems to concur with numer-
ous other writers in that he sees the main problem with the Kosovo intervention
in particular and unauthorized humanitarian intervention in general as having to
do with the fact that “the legal principles of non-intervention and non-use of force
would no longer be sacrosanct.”221 He attempts to define a framework for judging
the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. Defining clear criteria for interven-
tion could in his opinion allay the criticism that has been presented against “mil-
itary humanitarianism.” These criteria could then, it is argued, be used to guide
the debate in the Security Council if there is disagreement among the permanent
members.
Wheeler’s criteria are divided into six principles that an intervention should fulfil
for it to be considered “humanitarian” and thus justifiable. These criteria are as
follows, and their content should be evident from their titles: A) just cause; B) last
resort; C) good over harm; D) proportionality; E) right intention; F) reasonable
prospect of success.222 Similar suggestions have been made by others, for example
by Greenwood, whose perspective is the acceptability of intervention without Se-
curity Council authorization but in accordance with customary international law.
His criteria are: A) the most serious humanitarian emergency; B) necessity of in-
tervention; C) inability of the Security Council to take action.223
The fact is, however, that a legal-political framework for judging the legitimacy
of intervention or any other use of force already exists in the form of the general
procedures of the Security Council, which is what makes Wheeler’s criteria prob-
lematic. Thus, the problems identified earlier also apply to the criteria suggested
by Wheeler, Greenwood et al. Integrating these “more refined” or “more detailed”
principles into the procedures of the Council is unlikely to make decision-making
220Falk 1999, p. 852–853.
221Wheeler 2001, p. 552.
222Wheeler 2001, p. 554–560.
223Greenwood 1999, p. 170–171. See also Cassese 1999, p. 27, where a number of conditions
are defined under which “resort to armed force may gradually become justified, even absent any
authorization by the Security Council.”
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more impartial. If, for example, a permanent member wanted to employ the veto
to prevent military action from receiving authorization from the Security Council,
for whatever purpose, it could simply point to a lack of a “reasonable prospect
of success” or to an impending failure to meet the criterion of “good over harm.”
If anything, defining more or less formal criteria for intervention could very well
make it easier to “misuse” or “abuse” the veto, whatever the definition of misuse or
abuse might be. If a set of detailed abstract criteria is defined in advance, the eas-
ier it becomes both politically and legally to argue that a particular requirement
for approving intervention has not been met in a specific case.
Furthermore, a stricter and more legalistic definition of criteria would lend even
more credence to any rejection of a “legitimate” intervention by the Security Coun-
cil, thereby impeding the possibility of using an “extra-legal” exit based on ethical
considerations as justification. In other words, if criteria for humanitarian inter-
vention had been defined on an abstract level well before the Kosovo intervention,
perhaps even officially integrated into the procedures of the Security Council, and
if those criteria had then been considered by the Council and the intervention then
rejected because of Chinese and Russian opposition, for example, that opposition
would have made the unauthorized Kosovo intervention even more difficult ethi-
cally and politically than it was, as the Council would have explicitly rejected the
notion that the specific conditions required for intervention had been fulfilled.
Thus, if one wants to indulge oneself in the formulation of criteria for humani-
tarian intervention, it would be more advisable to concentrate on drafting moral,
ethical or political requirements for unauthorized interventions instead of working
on suggestions for legal standards that could become “hard law” in the future—
whatever that is taken to mean in international law224—but both pursuits are
something that the present writer would advise against in light of the observa-
tions made above.
In any case, it must be emphasized that attempting to define criteria for inter-
vention with the goal of somehow getting official approval for such rules within
the United Nations system is an unrealistic venture at best. For example, it can
be surmised that China and Russia were wary of supporting intervention even in
a singular case for fear of creating a precedent with regard to human rights viola-
tions and intervention that could work against them in the future. It is quite obvi-
224Cf. Wheeler 2001, p. 564–566. As regards the question of whether international law is “hard
law” or not, see e.g. D’Amato 1985, who contends that the system of international affairs does con-
stitute a system where enforcement does take place in a “hard law” sense—in contrast to numerous
views often presented to the contrary.
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ous that general criteria would present even more of a risk from their perspective,
and those countries as permanent members of the Council are unlikely to give up
the power that is inherent in their position—an act that the approving of criteria
for authorizing humanitarian intervention would necessarily amount to. Never-
theless, as Wheeler states, “there is little prospect of an immediate breakthrough
in this area”—thus, arguments regarding the effects that such criteria would have
are likely to remain theoretical.225
Thus, not only do attempts to formulate criteria for future interventions suffer
from problems of a pragmatic nature, but they also run into the problems one
experiences when trying to provide justification for illegal interventions through
legal arguments. The lesson to be learned may be that conflicts where immutable
rules of international law collide with moral and ethical issues are by definition
not solvable through legal interpretation, and a similar lesson may concern the
formulation of intervention criteria, as such norms will either fall into the cate-
gory of suggestions for unimplementable legal reforms or the category of moral
and ethical statements that are not necessarily helpful in legal argumentation in
themselves.226 However, this is not to say that all commentary regarding the con-
tent for pre-defined criteria should be disposed of; instead, the unavoidable legal
and pragmatic limitations that such approaches are characterized by should be
recognized.
Concluding observation. Attempts at justifying the Kosovo intervention fall victim to
the problems identified in the previous section—namely, the tendency to appeal to
legal arguments that appear convincing only on an abstract level. The fact that it is
possible to put forward numerous seemingly valid arguments of international law
in support of the legality of the use of force in a case where the said use of force
is widely agreed to have been illegal is something that testifies to the problems
inherent in a strictly legalistic approach to the issue. This is further demonstrated
by the dilemmas that are involved with the endeavor of attempting to formulate
lists of criteria for future interventions.
225Wheeler 2001, p. 566.
226Cf. Koskenniemi 2002, p. 168: “The more precise the proposed criteria, the more automatic
their application, the more arbitrary and exclusion or inclusion would appear. And this would be
arbitrariness not just in regard to some contested policy but to the humanitarian point of the rule.”
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5.3 A Precedent without Precedent
The central question of what status the Kosovo intervention should be afforded—
i.e., whether it should be considered to be justifiable as an extra-legal excep-
tion or given another position altogether—is closely tied to the effects of the ap-
proach chosen. — In the slightly optimistic appraisal of Greenwood, certain events
of the 1990s—e.g., the Pinochet case and the creation of international criminal
tribunals—were evidence of a historical opportunity to move human rights and
similar agendas from the realm of mere treaties to reality on the international
arena.227 However, he recognizes that these changes also brought with them prob-
lems not encountered before, and that Kosovo presented “a more difficult case”
than the relatively straightforward and uncontroversial East Timor crisis, for ex-
ample.228
In Greenwood’s view, NATO was justified in resorting to force, even though the
action taken was contrary to the basic principles of international law. His com-
ments are a simple and illustrative description of the nature of the problem: the
statement that the NATO military action was morally right but unlawful implies
“a terrible criticism of international law”—if the law does not match morality, it
logically follows the law should change.229 Nevertheless, considering the Kosovo
operation “a violation of international law albeit morally legitimate” does seem to
be the approach favored by many scholars of international law as well as many of
the states that supported the Kosovo intervention or took part in it, as pointed out
by Rytter.230
Of course, such an approach provokes numerous questions, one of the most central
and least obvious ones being: what if the law cannot be changed—or, to rephrase,
what if the United Nations cannot be reformed? The mismatch between legality
on the one hand and legitimacy on the other is particularly problematic when po-
litical realities prevent it from being resolved. Law, especially international law,
has never been very “logical” in the sense of being suited to analyses of formal
logic,231 for example, but if the discrepancy between law and morality becomes ir-
reconcilable, the post-WWII system of international relations may be in danger of
227Greenwood 1999.
228Greenwood 1999, p. 142–143.
229Greenwood 1999, p. 144.
230Rytter 2001, p. 157.
231This may be due to the widely agreed-upon inapplicability of formal logic to the analysis of
language.
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becoming obsolete, and a better system is not in sight.232 In other words, if the law
cannot be altered to match (a specific system of) morality, there are few good op-
tions available. However, it does not follow that the spectrum of options—possibly
including a solution that is the “least bad” alternative—shouldn’t be explored.
Greenwood concentrates on one of the most important aspects of the dilemmas
presented by the Kosovo intervention: since numerous writers have supported the
view that the intervention was illegal but morally legitimate, there are also many
who believe that the law should not be changed (for whatever reason) but instead
contend that sometimes states will simply have to act outside the law. Greenwood
is particularly critical of this view, as it not only does away with the task of for-
mulating principles for intervention233 as “too difficult” but also serves to create
a permanent gap between legitimacy and legality—something that is more than
untenable when questions as important as the prevention of genocide and the use
of force are concerned.234 However, it seems that with the heterogenous character
of the system of international relations and the inability of the international com-
munity to arrive at a consensus in contentious cases such as Kosovo, the danger of
ending up with a dichotomy of legality and morality will always remain a problem
in international law.
Simma states that the U.N. Charter would have to be changed to overcome the
international legal problems with humanitarian intervention, but such a change is
not something that is expected in the foreseeable future.235 This is a fact that is
obvious because of political realities, but the problem is somewhat exacerbated by
the inherently ambiguous nature of the present international system. Of course,
one could argue that such indefiniteness of a system actually makes it easier to
alter the system—i.e., specific procedural requirements do not have to be fulfilled,
only a “sufficient” level of consensus has to be reached, et cetera—but that doesn’t
appear to be the case, at least not with the doctrines of humanitarian intervention.
However, such a system does carry the advantage of arguably leaving open the
232See Hannikainen 1999, p. 80. According to Hannikainen, there existed the danger of the in-
ternational community ending up in a “stalemate” (“pattitilanne” in original Finnish.) However,
he makes the unrealistic suggestion of creating a new international organization to replace it; un-
fortunately, the fact may be that it is easier to make the United Nations fall apart than to reform
it—which is in turn easier than replacing the United Nations with a new organization. Thus, if the
possibility of reforming the United Nations is not in sight due to a “stalemate,” establishing a new
system to replace the U.N. will be even more unrealistic.
233Cf. the discussion in the previous section on the problems involved with the drafting of criteria
for intervention.
234Greenwood 1999, p. 144–145.
235Simma 1999, p. 6. Compelling evidence of the difficulty of reforming the United Nations was
recently seen in the 60th Anniversary U.N. Summit where reforms of the Security Council were not
even attempted.
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possibility of using a one-time extra-legal solution when exceptional circumstances
so dictate.
One must recognize that in the future, situations may come up where law and
morality again collide in a manner that results in an unresolvable dilemma in the
current international system. Thus, there is a definite need to appreciate extra-
legal approaches which could function as a kind of “emergency vent” in cases
where international law stricto sensu fails to offer a particularly good way out of
a seemingly unsolvable problem. The main philosophy behind such approaches
could perhaps be compared to the legal status of cannabis in the Netherlands:
when none of the different legal solutions—legalization or prohibition—can be
expected to yield acceptable results, a more “flexible” system has been instituted
that is based on its very ambiguity: there exist things that are illegal but where the
law is not enforced. These approaches share similarities with certain legislative
approaches to euthanasia.236
A separate question is whether such solutions are feasible in the current interna-
tional system and to what extent they can be employed without the rules on the
use of force being eroded. Kosovo is as hard a “hard case” as one can expect to run
into in international law,237 and the failure of international law to provide work-
able legal solutions to such cases may both threaten the future of international law
and strengthen it at the same time. Implementing extra-legal “emergency vents”
in international law can amount to treading down a “slippery slope,” but it has
already been argued that the limited use of exceptional measures such as those
utilized by NATO in Kosovo would bolster the position of international law if the
illegality of those actions is maintained by their perpetrators and a conception
of them as precedent is never allowed to overtake their character as exceptional
extra-legal measures.238 The assessment to be made from that perspective is the
extent to which the Kosovo intervention actually had a precedent-setting effect
and the extent to which it should be afforded that status.
236On the euthanasia parallel, see Brownlie 1973, p. 146. Cf. also the mitigation aspect below.
See also Chesterman 2001, p. 226. Another example of ambiguity being used as a legal-political
strategy in international law is the Israeli policy of nuclear deterrence whereby Israel neither denies
nor acknowledges its possession of nuclear weapons.
237However, an even “harder” example might have been presented in the Advisory Opinion of the
ICJ regarding the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, where the
Court was evenly split on the key issue of whether the use of nuclear weapons would be lawful in
an “extreme circumstance of self-defence.” The matter itself is strange to consider in light of the
fact that such events might very well lead to a world where international law as we know it would
no longer exist. See also Kennedy 2004, p. 316–323. He writes: “[T]he judges decided the case
seven to seven. Yet no one seemed to mind.” Kennedy 2004, p. 319.
238Cf. the considerations presented in the previous section and in Ch. 4.1, p. 41.
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Thus, the problem is whether the Kosovo situation should be viewed as an excep-
tional case where extra-legal measures can be employed in the absence of better al-
ternatives in circumstances that cannot be allowed to persist. In international law,
it seems that the line between legal and extra-legal can be as ambiguous as the line
between legal and illegal. The question to be considered, then, is the legal effect
of these extra-legal “emergency vents”—apart from the strengthening / eroding ef-
fect on international law mentioned above—and how “extra-legal” such solutions
should be.
The overall position taken by Simma is that the action by NATO in Kosovo was sep-
arated from legality only by “a thin red line.” It seems that hard cases such as this
can be either beneficial or detrimental to international law: depending on their
outcome and their effect on the international community, they can help develop
international law in new directions, perhaps guided by ethical principles, or lead
into its marginalization. Simma appears to be concerned of the dangers of the lat-
ter case: in his opinion, such cases should remain as isolated as possible, because
they have the potential to “erode the rules of international law.”239 In Simma’s
approach, considerable emphasis is put on the assertion that Kosovo should be an
exceptional exception.240 He warns of the possibility of undermining the system
of collective security, that is, not only the system of international law.241 In other
words, if carrying out the Kosovo intervention was justified as an extreme case, an
example of a moral and ethical necessity to prevent grave breaches of humanitar-
ian norms, it should nevertheless remain an exception that does not create new
international law or a new policy or doctrine.242 Rytter offers a similar caveat:
even though norms of humanitarian intervention are intended to prevent human
suffering, the use of force in international relations has also led to immense hu-
manitarian catastrophes, and it has taken a lot of time and effort to establish a
prohibition on the use of force—something that should not be jeopardized.243
Even though this is a point of view that may be relatively easy to subscribe to, it
seems that Simma still underestimates the possibility of “exceptional exceptions”
in fact strengthening international law. This strengthening could be twofold in its
effect. Firstly, stressing the illegality of an operation while emphasizing its neces-
239Simma 1999, p. 22.
240Simma 1999, p. 14: “[T]he decisive point is that we should not change the rules simply to
follow our humanitarian impulses; we should not set new standards only to do the right thing in a
single case.”
241Simma 1999, p. 1: “[S]hould such an approach become a regular part of [NATO’s] strategic
programme for the future, it would undermine the universal system of collective security.”
242Simma 1999, p. 14.
243Rytter 2001, p. 158–159.
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sity from a moral point of view would make the delineation between legality and
illegality clearer and thus make the system less ambiguous.244 Secondly, it can
be argued that the moral arguments in favor of an operation such as the one in
Kosovo in fact serve the purpose and spirit, if not the letter, of the obligations that
bind states under international law.245 In fact, it would seem that the danger with
“hard cases” is that while they make bad law, they make good ethics—i.e., they
can call into question the fundamentals of the system of international law, thereby
undermining its credibility. Thus, the actual problem would not be the erosion of
the present system in itself, but the fact that instituting a new system where these
ethical and moral considerations could be taken into account more efficiently may
be something that is impossible in the present political situation—resulting in a
legal vacuum with moral problems of an even more serious nature if the present
system were to be abandoned.
According to Rytter, the grounds on which violations of existing norms are
justified—on legal or on purely moral or political grounds—is crucial from the
point of view of the evolution of customary international law, as purely moral or
extra-legal justifications cannot contribute to the modifying of norms. This point is
connected to the strategy employed by NATO countries and the view put forward
by Germany in particular, both of which are examined by Simma.246 NATO did not
specifically refer to a doctrine of “humanitarian intervention” but still used lines
of argumentation that bore strong resemblance to it. The organization put heavy
emphasis on its willingness to follow the U.N. Charter and other sources of inter-
national law at least in spirit. It was the intention of NATO to convey an image
of its actions that portrayed it as enforcing and maintaining the resolutions of the
Security Council, particularly S/RES/1199.247 The intervening parties emphasized
semi-legal arguments, i.e., they relied on the idea of carrying out the intent of the
Security Council or enforcing the human rights obligations of the Charter, while
not formulating their views in a strictly legal style—furthermore, as Cassese points
out, the intervening states did not claim that the action taken was in accordance
244Cf. the arguments presented on p. 41 of the present study with regard to the possibility that
breaches to a rule may actually strengthen the rule if certain conditions are met.
245See, for example, Franck 1999, p. 859: “Even an illegal action, if instrumental in bringing
about results widely desired by a community, will not seriously undermine a resilient legal system,
one with the elasticity to make allowances for mitigating circumstances.” On the mitigation aspect,
cf. Kohen 2003, p. 220: “[J]ustifications could act as a mitigating circumstance, not to preclude
wrongfulness, but with regard to the consequences arising from that act with regard to State
responsibility.”
246Simma 1999, p. 12–14. See also Cassese 2000, p. 792–793.
247According to Simma, the aforementioned resolution was worded in such a way that it was an
insufficient justification for military intervention. Simma 1999, p. 12.
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with international law.248 The view embraced in German statements on the inter-
vention was one in which the question of legality was de-emphasized more clearly
and in which the notion that Kosovo should not become a precedent was more or
less explicitly propounded.249
According to Simma, attempts at legal justification will ultimately remain unsatis-
factory but the illegality of humanitarian intervention “cannot be the last word,”
either. In other words, it appears that an extra-legal approach is indeed called for.
Such an exit—one that stays close to the approach of Simma—is provided by the
German view of Kosovo as an “exception,” and this is what Simma in the end
prefers.250 As has been noted, such an approach could in fact strengthen the rules
on the use of force instead of eroding them. However, this seems to be a solution
that has to be used very sparingly: one cannot claim to be resorting to exceptional
means available only in a singular case, if the same justification is invoked again
later.251
It appears that the decision on which “extra-legal” justification to employ—or
whether to employ one at all (or whether declining to provide a carefully thought-
out justification to an action such as the one carried out by NATO still amounts
to providing an argument)252 will ultimately rest on political and practical consid-
erations. The concerns that underlie positions such as the one taken by Germany
are well summed up at the end of Simma’s article: there is the risk of NATO “self-
authorization,” a genie-in-the-bottle that must not be released.253 Cassese also
voices certain caveats that echo the commentary of Simma: if a group of powerful
nations utilizes human rights—or other arguments—to work around the limita-
tions and procedures that curtail the use of force, a Pandora’s box may be opened
that may be difficult to close. Even though NATO attempted to make its actions as
“legal” as possible by referring to the previous Council resolutions and the spirit of
the U.N. Charter, there nevertheless exists the danger of creating a precedent that
248Cassese 2000, p. 792.
249Simma 1999, p. 13, and Rytter 2001, p. 153–155.
250Simma 1999, p. 14: “[. . . ] regard the Kosovo crisis as a singular case in which NATO decided to
act without Security Council authorization out of overwhelming humanitarian necessity, but from
which no general conclusion should be drawn.” Interestingly, emphasizing the extra-legal nature is
done in this approach with the goal of preserving the status of legal norms.
251Note Rytter’s emphasis on the assertion that an extra-legal “escape” must only be used very
rarely. Rytter 2001, p. 151.
252Cf. the fact that declining to appear in the International Court of Justice is not without its
effects: see e.g. Elkind 1984. However, this was not the strategy chosen by NATO countries in
Legality of Use of Force. Cf. Gray 2000, p. 23: “Rather than not even attempt a legal justification,
commonly states offer what may seem weak or unconvincing viewpoints.”
253Simma 1999, p. 20.
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brings to mind the Warsaw Pact action that was carried out in Czechoslovakia in
1968, as Laurenti, quoted by Simma, points out.254
The main risk appears to be that if the Kosovo intervention and the arguments put
forward in support of it created a more general norm of humanitarian interven-
tion, it could become a norm of intervention without Security Council authoriza-
tion for any reasons that a single state or a group of states deems sufficient. Such
an insidious development would give rise to a situation where there would be no
limit to the sphere of possible interventions but a rapid end to the present system
where strict limits constrain the use of force in international relations.
Furthermore, Cassese argues that an opinio necessitatis may have formed instead
of an opinio iuris: i.e., the consensus has come into existence that certain actions
can be in breach of the law while still being necessary from a political, econom-
ical or moral standpoint.255 According to Cassese, opinio necessitatis was “strong
and widespread” but did not amount to anything that could be said to support
the notion that a general rule of humanitarian intervention had crystallized in
international law. Thus, treating the Kosovo case as a singular exception with no
precedent-creating effect appears to be quite possible: as Cassese points out, a new
customary rule cannot be inferred on the basis of a single episode, regardless of
its magnitude.256
It is interesting to consider in light of Cassese’s view about opinio necessitatis the
possibility that the fundamental effects of the Kosovo intervention were not legal
but political in character. The operation and the resulting reaction may not have
created a new customary rule of international law, as elements generally agreed to
be necessary requirements for the creation of such a new rule did not exist to the
extent required, but a new “rule” may have become apparent in the political arena:
Western states are willing to overstep the boundaries of the use of force regulation
of the Charter system if human rights violations of sufficient severity are taking
place in a country that shares a geographical, political or historical connection
254Ibid.
255Cassese 2000, p. 798. Similarly, Rytter states that “NATO’s bombing campaign has been widely
stamped [. . . ] as a violation of international law, albeit morally legitimate” and that “there are no
signs of an emerging opinio juris among states in the aftermath of NATO’s war that unauthorised
humanitarian intervention is under certain circumstances lawful.” Rytter 2001, p. 157.
256Cassese 2000, p. 797. Cassese notes that “the matter is too delicate and controversial to war-
rant the contention that the evolution of international law in this area may result from a single
episode,” with particular reference to the special status that sovereignty has under the present
system.
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with the West, as was the case with Kosovo.257 The atrocities in Chechnya may not
result in explicit condemnations from European states or major Western powers,
while it could be estimated that similar human rights violations in the Ukraine or
in Moldova, for example, would result in some type of action—in an extreme case,
perhaps even military action or a threat to use military force—from the West. The
effect that recent developments, such as the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force
of the European Union, will ultimately impart on this state of semi-ambiguity is
something that can only be assessed in the future.
When one sets out to formulate an opinion on the Kosovo situation, regardless of
the legal (or extra-legal or ethical) position adopted, the ambiguities regarding the
foundations of international law lead to problems, as hard cases such as Kosovo
unavoidably touch upon those foundations. The lack of clear meta-rules appears to
be one of the underlying factors that make the Kosovo case such a perplexing one.
Commentators often have differing views of the rules and it sometimes appears
as if fundamental rules were made up in an ad hoc manner. Even though the log-
ical basis of the questions themselves seems—at least on occasion—frustratingly
indeterminate, the basic legal nature of the dilemmas presented is more or less
apparent: it is unavoidable that the prohibition on the use of force and the in-
creasing importance of human rights doctrines are at odds when humanitarian
intervention is examined, and the Kosovo intervention happened to be the case
where that conflict became so obvious so suddenly.258
Even in the absence of clear common ground among commentators in terms of
their fundamental approaches to the system of international law, it can be stated
that the dilemma mentioned above is the basic problem that is being debated
when the justifiability of humanitarian interventions is discussed. It is of no use
to “discard” international law and the debate on law and morality, even if find-
ing appropriate solutions to real-life problems seems impossible or exceedingly
difficult within the present international system. In other words, there exists an
ambiguous system of international law on which we must rely in the long run to
reconcile the discrepancy between the legal ban on the use of force and the pu-
tative moral right or duty to uphold human rights obligations. A sound approach
well suited to such a system is a position that remains relatively close to the one
257Cf. the assessment in Franck 1999, p. 859: “[E]gregious repression of minorities is not a risk-
free venture [. . . ]”
258Cf. Harhoff 2001, p. 66; see also p. 39 of the present study. However, cf. the view put forward by
Gowlland-Debbas 2000, p. 378–379: inter alia, Art. 2(7) does not limit the powers of the Security
Council under Ch. VII as such; in addition, there had previously been willingness on part of the
Council to interpret violations of human rights as threatening international peace and security.
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advocated by Simma—a solution wherein the Kosovo case is regarded as a singular
exception, avoiding the promotion of a new doctrine of humanitarian intervention
with its unavoidable pitfalls, while still leaving open the option of pursuing cer-
tain humanitarian measures should the need arise in the future. It is obvious that
such an approach is not insusceptible to problems, and its main drawback may
be that it bears the danger of leading to considerable ambiguity and instigating
ominous legal conflicts if humanitarian dilemmas similar to that of Kosovo reoc-
cur in the future. Nonetheless, in light of the viewpoints presented in this study,
adhering to such a solution while expending maximum effort to prevent further
incidents of humanitarian suffering from taking place is the optimal position to be
advocated—regardless of whether the issue is examined from a legal, political or
ethical perspective.
Concluding observation. There are convincing arguments for treating the Kosovo
intervention as an extra-legal necessity whose precedent-setting legal effect is min-
imal, as it can be argued that such an approach minimizes the damage inflicted
on the prohibition on the use of force while still taking humanitarian concerns
into account. While it is an unavoidable drawback of this solution that it is not
particularly well suited to reuse, it is the view of the present writer that it is the
preferable “exit” out of the apparent legal dead end created by the Kosovo crisis.
Traces of the position presented here can be discerned in the rhetorical strategy
exhibited in statements made by the Kosovo interveners. Furthermore, it may be
that while the NATO action indeed did not bring about a legal norm of humanitar-
ian intervention, the political “rule” it may have created in Europe and its fringes
cannot be overlooked.
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6 Whither Intervention? Or: Wither, Intervention?
The issue that we set out to investigate was the problem of the general acceptability
of humanitarian intervention and the extent to which the Kosovo case could—or
should—be considered a precedent for future interventions. The viewpoints that
have been examined in this study have demonstrated that the extremes of strict
adherence to the prohibition on the use of force, on the one hand, and advocating
the abandonment of the Charter system in favor of what has been called “military
humanitarianism,” on the other, fail to provide the international lawyer with an
optimal answer. Some may consider such a conclusion obvious, but finding a ten-
able solution to the dilemma requires that a diligent examination of the factors
pro and con is conducted. In the present inquiry, an approach has been favored
wherein an analysis of certain fundamental aspects of human rights doctrines—
with particular reference to the purported universality of rights—was connected to
an examination of the criticism that has been presented of the political and prac-
tical issues pertaining to intervention, which, in turn, served as background for
a legal-pragmatic assessment of the Kosovo case and its implications for interven-
tionism in general. At this point, certain closing observations may be in order in
light of the foregoing.
An undeniable starting point in an investigation into the problem must be the
concession that human rights fail to bear historical or empirical universality in a
strict sense; nevertheless, it is the view of the present writer that the issues of the
modern world necessitate the existence—be it manufactured or pre-existing—of a
common morality that is global in scope but relatively limited in breadth. In this
vein, it is reasonable to assert that genocide and atrocities of its ilk are in flagrant
violation of the values that can be considered a reflection of the universal inter-
ests of the international community. While maintaining an effective and credible
international public order based on the peaceful cooperation of nations can be ar-
gued to require the enforcement of norms which protect those universal interests,
it must not escape notice that it would be ill-advised to elevate those values and
interests to the position of a novel “secular religion” due to the misgivings that
such a strategy would incite among many—and, in the position of this writer, due
to the problems associated with the very notion of religious dogmata.
However, international law need not become subservient to doctrines professing
to protect the common interest of the global community, a matter obvious to those
who comprehend the historically-rooted genesis of current doctrines: attempts by
77
the West to gain a position as the “discoverer” and an “enforcing torchbearer”
of universal rights can be expected to be met with skepticism, as those rights
do not possess the property of universality in the sense of being “discoverable.”
Thus, it is practical dilemmas that can appear insurmountable, as unenforced rights
would lack relevance, as the dearth of credible contenders to the position of a
more impartial enforcer cannot be denied and as the dubious actions taken in
the name of civilization and humanitarianism in the past make it obvious why
interventionism is often opposed with such vehemence.
The law on interventions is relatively unambiguous: even if motivated by morally
laudable considerations and justified through arguments based on a teleological
interpretation of the Charter, the use of force without an explicit authorization
from the Security Council is an action in violation of international law. The fact
that controversy which is as wide-ranging as that which stemmed from the inter-
vention in Kosovo can arise in the face of such legal certainties is attributable to
something that most international lawyers undoubtedly comprehend and consider
self-evident but nevertheless rarely acknowledge in explicit terms—that is, the fact
that the line between law and politics may be hard to draw in international rela-
tions.
The question that this situation prompts, then, is one of which approach it is that
is advisable to adopt on the issue of contentious interventions, “approach” here re-
ferring to the position taken with regard to both legal and practical problems and
taking into account considerations of both types. In light of the observations pre-
sented herein, the overarching conclusion to be drawn is that a conservative—in
the sense of cautionary—stance is called for, due to certain issues whose impor-
tance and propensity to recur in analyses of the problem favors such an approach:
the importance of maintaining the current limits on the use of force, the “fragility”
of the rules of international law, the historical precedents of interventions that
have served less than benevolent agendas, and summa summarum, the fact that
(to formulate it bluntly) changing international law to include a right of human-
itarian intervention without introducing to it elements prone to abuse or making
the entire system lose its relevance altogether may be impossible for the foresee-
able future.
It appears fairly obvious upon closer examination that attempts at providing legal
justifications for the Kosovo intervention were quite contrived indeed—a conclu-
sion that might have been reachable a priori due to the very illogicality of there
existing a plausible legal excuse for actions that were generally agreed to be un-
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pardonable in legal terms, something that even the present system of international
law in its malleability declines to yield to. Thus, arguments presented in favor of
extra-legal solutions wherein the intervention is conceived of as having an excep-
tional “one-time” character are persuasive in their ability to steer clear of the legal
problems involved with approving of the intervention and the ethical problems
involved with disapproving of it. Nonetheless, the nature of strategies of this type
preclude them from being reapplied to subsequent interventions, as future actions
would then either acquire precedent status or contribute to making the current
rules on the use of force obsolescent.
Furthermore, the benefits associated with the widely agreed upon interpretation
that the Kosovo case failed to establish a customary norm of humanitarian inter-
vention leads the present writer to conclude that endeavoring to codify or even
define in advance a set of criteria for intervention may be an enterprise that is des-
tined to be futile or at least counterproductive—in particular, explicit conditions
for “legal” or “acceptable” interventions can prove amenable to abuse and distor-
tion more readily than a state of ambiguity would. In fact, the practical-political
repercussions of the Kosovo intervention—the message or “precedent” that the
case can plausibly be argued to have created or conveyed to the international
community—may be interpreted as a manifestation of this approach: depending
on the circumstances, a crisis on the geographical and cultural fringes of the West
may result in humanitarian countermeasures of the military type even in the ab-
sence of Council authorization—a deterrent that may be effective due to its very
ambiguity.
It would appear that the problems associated with the concept of humanitarian
intervention are ultimately pragmatic in nature. The examination of certain criti-
cal approaches to the issue demonstrated that even methodologically suspect ap-
praisals of the topic can prove valuable in contributing to identifying many of the
practical drawbacks that interventionism entails; nevertheless, one needs to be
mindful of the methodological and philosophical quagmires introduced by such
approaches to avoid declining into absurdity.259
While it is undeniable that certain humanitarian crises may sometimes need to be
counteracted with force, the road to Hell is indeed paved with good interventions,
259Allott puts forward the provocative question, “Who killed philosophy?” Allott 1999, p. 49. As
the philosophical underpinnings and practical implications of certain approaches to humanitarian
intervention and to international law in general call into question their very relevance—something
that has been touched upon in this study—the present writer cannot but draw the conclusion that
the death of philosophy may have been self-inflicted.
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and the reasons lie on a practical level. The more conspicuous explanation can
be summarized by stating that good interventions go bad more often than not—
in other words, the humanitarian countermeasures may overtake the atrocities in
their undesirable effects. The limits that have been imposed on the use of force
will be in jeopardy if unauthorized interventions become the norm rather than the
exception, giving rise to a risk of a less overt but more significant nature: overem-
phasizing the undeniable ethical dilemmas inherent in the present system may cast
doubts upon its sustainability from a moral standpoint. Therefore, a future where
it is superseded by a new order where the use of force is not bound by the shack-
les of a strict legal régime may become all too enticing. A cautious and critical
but nonetheless non-nihilistic approach rooted in reality is the one that should be
embraced with respect to humanitarian intervention. Giving the Kosovo interven-
tion value as a legal precedent may be irreconcilable with such an approach, but a
conservative stance on the matter does not preclude one from acknowledging the
practical-political significance of the Kosovo case. In an ambiguous system such as
that of international law, the best solution to a hard case may be one of ambiguity.
Quo vadis? While a sense of optimism will always linger in the minds of inter-
national lawyers and humanitarian activists, it can be challenging to avoid dis-
illusionment with the possibilities of international law as a means of effecting
profound and lasting change for the better. — “[T]o endow the world community
with the capability to address humanitarian emergencies without weakening the
bonds of restraint that restrict war-making by states” is what Falk recently iden-
tified as “the most pressing challenge.”260 The lamentable state of affairs on the
international arena leads one to a conclusion that is as inescapable as it is unfortu-
nate: it may very well be that the mission Falk calls “the most pressing challenge”
turns out to be a most depressing challenge.
260Falk 2004, p. 45.
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